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Preface 
T
HE SPACE SHUTTLE avionics system represents a 
significant advance in avionics system technology. The 
system was conceived in the early 1970's, developed 
throughout that decade, and became operational in the 
1980's. Yet even today in 1988, it remains the most 
sophisticated, most advanced, most integrated avionics 
system in operational use in the aerospace arena. Some 
of the more significant "firsts" achieved by the system 
include the following. 
0 I represents the first successful attempt to incorporate 
a comprehensive fail operational/ fail sale concept in 
an avionics system. 
• It pioneered the development of complex redundancy 
management techniques, some of which rival the 
expert system approaches emerging today. 
• It is the first operational aerospace system to use digital 
data bus technology to perform flight-critical 
functions. 
• It is the first operational system to utilize a high-order 
language to develop and produce onboard software. 
• It is the first operational aerospace program to make 
extensive use of flight software program overlays from 
a tape memory to expand the effective size of computer 
memory. 
• It is the first system to integrate the flight control 
function with the rest of the avionics functions. 
• It included the first use of digital fly-by-wire technology 
in an operational atmospheric flight application. 
• It is the first avionics system to use a multifunction 
cathode-ray-tube display and crew interface approach. 
• It is the first avionics system to provide extensive 
operational services to onboard nonaviomcs systems. 
Such pioneering innovations and concepts are remark-
able in that they emerged in a design environment which 
would be considered archaic by today's standards. For 
instance, the data processing state of the art has turned 
over at least four times since the Space Shuttle design was 
conceived. In 1974, there were no off-the-shelf microcom-
puters, large-scale integrated-circuit technology was 
emerging but immature, and the use of data buses for critical
functions was considered to be radical and of high risk. 
Prior to the Space Shuttle, aerospace systems were made 
up of an essentially independent collection of subsystems, 
organized along disciplinary lines such as flight control, 
guidance and navigation, communications, and instrumen-
tation. Each subsystem typically had its own dedicated 
controls, displays, and command and signal paths. The 
Space Shuttle avionics system not only integrated the 
computational requirements of all subsystems in one central 
computer complex, but introduced the concept of 
multifunction controls, displays, and command/ data paths. 
The overall system design was driven by mission 
requirements and vehicle constraints never before encoun-
tered in a space program. Significant among these were 
the following. 
• The requirement for multiple reuse over a 20-year 
period - The economic and safety-related impacts 
of aborting alter one failure required that the system 
have a two-fault-tolerant fail operational/ fail sale 
configuration. 
• The requirement that comparison of data or 
performance from independent systems or components 
operating in parallel be the primary means of detecting 
and isolating failures and assessing system operational 
status 
- To detect the second failure in a system, four parallel 
strings were required and baselined. 
- The use of built-in test was excluded wherever 
possible as a less reliable fault isolation technique. 
• The requirement for an unpowered landing on a 
runway - The stringent performance required 
prohibited the use of degraded backup systems. 
• The autonomy requirement - Large quantities of 
instrumentation data, transmitted to the ground on 
previous programs for spacecraft functional assess-
ment and subsystem management, had to be processed 
onboard and made available to the crew in usable 
forms. 
• The Space Shuttle vehicle which evolved was an 
unstable airframe requiring sufficient control authority 
to cause structural failure if an erroneously applied 
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hardover control actuator command was allowed to 
remain in effect for as little as 10 to 400 milliseconds. 
- Full-time stability augmentation was baselined, 
direct control modes were excluded, and digital 
autopilots were designated to accommodate the 
wide spectrum of control. 
- Manual intervention or switching of active/ standby 
strings proved inadequate to overcome the effects 
of erroneous hardover commands; therefore, a 
system approach was baselined in which hardovers 
were prevented through the use of multiple, parallel-
operating, synchronized processors and command 
paths to drive force-summing control actuators. 
• The large size of the Space Shuttle vehicle resulted 
in the weight of wire, both signal and power, being 
a significant proportion of the avionics system weight. 
- Multiplexed serial digital data buses were used for 
command and data transmission throughout the 
vehicle. 
Solid-state remote power control devices were used 
to reduce the quantity of power cable needed. 
A myriad of other mission, vehicle, and system require-
ments influenced or dictated various aspects of the design; 
however, the basic system concepts were derived from those 
described.
The Space Shuttle avionics system which evolved features 
a five-computer central processing complex, which provides 
software services to all vehicle subsystems that require them. 
Each computer is connected to a network of 28 serial digital 
data buses, which distribute input/output commands and 
data to/from bus terminal units located throughout the 
vehicle. Dedicated hardware components, unique to the 
various subsystems, interface as necessary with bus terminal 
unit signal conditioning devices. During critical mission 
phases such as ascent and entry, the system is configured 
in four redundant, independent but synchronized strings, 
each controlling one-fourth of the redundant sensors and 
control effectors required for the operation in progress. 
A backup, simplex software package is installed in the filth 
computer to be used if a generic error causes failure of 
the total redundant set. During more benign mission phases 
such as on-orbit, the computer complex can be configured, 
by loading the appropriate software programs, to perform 
a wide variety of mission and payload support functions. 
The system includes more than 270 components, 
depending on the mission, and uses approximately 500 000 
lines of software code. Although very complex and difficult 
to describe or understand, the system has proven to be 
reliable, durable, extremely versatile, and a tribute to the 
multitudes who contributed to its design, development, and 
verification. 
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Section 1 Introduction 
Purpose of Document 
The Space Shuttle avionics system design roots are in the 
early 1970's, yet it remains the most sophisticated, 
integrated, innovative approach to an aerospace avionics 
system in use today - 16 years hence. It is the intent 
of this document to trace the origins and evolution of the 
system; to outline the requirements, constraints, and other 
factors which led to the final configuration; and to provide 
a comprehensive description of its operation and functional 
characteristics. The assumption is made that the reader 
is familiar with, or has access to, information about the 
basic Space Shuttle vehicle configuration and its 
subsystems. 
Organization 
The remainder of the document is organized into three 
sections. 
• In Section 2 - The Design Environment, the state 
of the electronics and aerospace art in the early 
seventies is assessed. The intent is to familiarize the 
reader with the environment in which the design 
evolved. 
• In Section 3 - System Design Evolution, the major 
requirements and other factors that led to the Space 
Shuttle avionics system configuration are developed. 
The overall design drivers and constraints are treated 
first, followed by a subsystem-by-subsystem discussion 
of the major tradeoffs and design issues that were 
addressed as the system evolved. 
• Section 4 - System Mechanization/ Operation 
contains a description of the system and of its 
functional operation. Each function or service 
provided is examined from the standpoint of the data 
processing hardware and software attributes used as 
well as of the additional unique avionics subsystem 
hardware required.
Use 
The Space Shuttle avionics system is very large and 
extremely complex and, therefore, is difficult to describe 
without becoming engulfed in details. The approach used 
here is to maintain a top-level perspective by frequent 
reference to the system block diagram contained in the 
foldout located inside the back cover. The reader is 
requested to examine the foldout at this time. Note that 
it can be extended without interfering with the reading 
of the document. To facilitate reference to various features 
of the system, letters (across the top and bottom) and 
numbers (along the sides) define zones that are used in 
the descriptions which follow. References to zones in the 
diagram will follow the alphanumeric convention (e.g., 
[B,3]) to identify locations. To the lower left of the diagram, 
note the color code legend which indicates the convention 
used to identify data buses. Note also that the diagram 
reflects the physical distribution of equipment in the vehicle. 
Because of the frequent references made to the diagram, 
it is recommended that it remain extended while the various 
sections, especially section 4, are examined. Even though 
subsystem and function descriptions may include more 
detailed, specialized diagrams and figures, it is very 
important that the overall perspective be maintained 
through the use of the system block diagram. 
As indicated previously, the document is intended not 
only to describe the Space Shuttle avionics system, but 
to develop the thesis for its configuration and its evolution. 
For the user not interested in the origins and evolution, 
section 4 is written to stand alone and may be used as 
a reference description of system mechanization and 
operation. 
Acronyms and abbreviations used herein are defined in 
the appendix. 
In compliance with the NASA's publication policy, the 
original units of measure have have been converted to the 
equivalent value in the Système International d'Unités (SI). 
As an aid to the reader, the SI units are written first and 
the original units are written parenthetically thereafter.
Section 2 The Design Environment 
Introduction 
To understand the configuration and makeup of the Space 
Shuttle avionics system, it is necessary to understand the 
technological environment of the early seventies. In the 
approximately 16 years since the inception of the system, 
computers and the associated technology have undergone 
four generations of change. If the system designers were 
operating in today's environment, a much different set of 
design choices and options would be available and, quite 
possibly, a different configuration would have resulted. This 
section is intended to familiarize the reader with the 
designer's world during the formative stages of the system, 
with the technology available, and with the pressure of 
factors other than technology which influenced the result. 
Although the state of technology was a major factor 
(and limitation) in the design of the avionics system, the 
effect of other factors was also significant. These include 
influences arising from traditional, conservative attitudes, 
as well as those associated with the environment in which 
the system was to operate. In any development program, 
a new approach or technique is correctly perceived to have 
unknown risks with potential cost and schedule implications 
and is to be avoided whenever possible. In addition, the 
designers, the flightcrew, and other operational users of 
the system often have a mindset, established in a previous 
program or experience, which results in a bias against new 
or different, "unconventional" approaches. Finally, the 
environment in which the system is to function must be 
considered. For instance, a new technique proposed for 
a system may not be viable if it requires a major change 
in the associated ground support complex. In the following 
paragraphs, a number of subsystem or functional areas 
are examined in the context of one or more of these factors. 
Avionics Hardware! Software 
In the early seventies, only two avionics computers under 
development were considered potentially capable of 
performing the Space Shuttle task. These were the IBM 
AP-101 (a derivative of the 4n technology used in various 
military and NASA flight programs) and the Singer-
Kearfott 5KC-2000 (then a candidate for the B-IA 
program). Both of these machines were judged to require 
extensive modification before being considered adequate.
No suitable off-the-shelf microcomputers were then 
available (no Z80's, 8086s, 68000's, etc.). Large-scale 
integrated-circuit technology was emerging but not 
considered mature enough for Space Shuttle use. Very little 
was known about the effects of lightning or radiation on 
high-density solid-state circuitry. Core memory was the only 
reasonably available choice for the Space Shuttle Orbiter 
computers; therefore, the memory size was limited by 
power, weight, and heat constraints. Data bus technology 
for real-time avionics systems was emerging but could not 
be considered operational. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
was developing MIL-STD-1553, the data bus standard, but 
it would not become official until 1975. All previous systems 
had used bundles of wires, each dedicated to a single signal 
or function. The use of tape units for software program 
mass storage in a dynamic environment was limited and 
suspect, especially for program overlays while in flight. 
Software design methodology was evolving rapidly with 
the emerging use of top-down, structured techniques. No 
high-order language tailored for aerospace applications 
existed, although NASA was in the process of developing 
a high-order software language for Shuttle (H AL! S), which 
subsequently become the Space Shuttle standard. 
Flight Control 
In all manned space programs preceding the Space Shuttle 
(Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo), fly-by-wire control systems 
were used for vehicle attitude and translation control. 
Although digital autopilots were developed for Apollo 
spacecraft, analog control systems were also included and 
considered necessary for backup. Aircraft flight control 
technology, however, had not advanced beyond the use 
of mechanical systems, augmented with hydraulic boost 
on large airplanes. Most aircraft applications of electronics 
in the flight control system used limited-authority analog 
stability-augmentation devices to improve aerodynamic 
handling qualities. Autopilots were also analog devices and 
also given limited authority. Neither the stability-
augmentation function nor the autopilot was considered 
critical for safe flight when implemented in these configura-
tions. The flight control hardware and subsystems were 
kept functionally and electrically separate from other 
electronic systems to the extent possible. 
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Guidance and Navigation 
Sophisticated guidance and navigation schemes and algo-
rithms had been developed and used in the Apollo Program; 
therefore, the technology base appeared adequate for the 
Space Shuttle in these disciplines. Although a new guidance 
and navigation challenge was posed by the entry through 
landing phase, no state-of-the-art advances were deemed 
necessary. 
Displays and Controls 
The pilot input devices in general use for aircraft control 
were a stick or a yoke/ wheel for roll and pitch, and rudder 
pedals for yaw. When hydraulic boost was used, elaborate 
sensing devices were included to provide the correct 
feedback to the pilot. Hand controllers without feedback 
and with only electrical outputs had been used in previous 
manned space programs; however, the application did not 
involve aerodynamic flight. Switches, pushbuttons, and 
other input devices were typically hardwired to the function, 
the box, or the subsystem that required the input. Displays 
were also hardwired, were generally mechanical, and were 
dedicated to the function served. Off-the-shelf horizontal 
and vertical situation displays, although electronically 
driven, utilized a mechanical presentation. Electronic 
attitude and directional indicator (EADI) technology was 
emerging but not in common use. Heads-up displays 
(HUD's) were also just emerging. The concept of 
multifunctional displays was immature and had never been 
used in an aerospace application. Many of the display and 
control design issues associated with management of a 
redundant system had never been addressed. 
Communications and Tracking 
A very capable S-band communications system had been 
developed for use on the Apollo Program; however, it could 
not serve the data rate, link margins, and coverage require-
ments forecast for Space Shuttle operations and experiment 
support. The NASA had led research in digital voice and 
sophisticated encoding and decoding techniques, but these 
had never been proven in an operational system. Solid-
state radiofrequency (RF) amplifiers capable of power 
output sufficient for skin-tracking radar were emerging but 
also not proven. The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) was considering an upgrade of the Instrument 
Landing System (ILS) to one using microwave scanning 
beam techniques capable of meeting Orbiter landing 
performance requirements, but no realistic conversion 
schedule existed. 
Redundancy Management 
The use of redundant systems to enable operation in the 
face of failures was common in both aircraft and space 
applications; however, all previous approaches used 
primary/ backup, active/ standby techniques which relied on 
manual recognition of faults and crew-initiated switchover 
to the alternate or backup system. Very little was known 
about the use and management of multiple sensors or other 
input devices and even less about multiple output devices 
such as hydraulic actuators. No aerospace project had even 
contemplated the automation of failure detection and 
recovery for large systems such as the reaction control 
system (RCS). The RCS required complex assessments of 
large numbers of temperature and pressure sensors, 
correlation with vehicle dynamic response to digital 
autopilot commands, and a variety of recovery options 
which depended on factors such as mission phase, 
propellant quantity, and available thruster configuration. 
The system which evolved required the use of techniques 
which rival those of expert systems being developed today.
Section 3 System Design Evolution 
Introduction 
The Space Shuttle avionics system is the result of a number 
of years of studies, analyses, design tradeoffs, and iterations 
conducted by NASA and the Space Shuttle contractors. 
The design was affected by a variety of requirements and 
constraints including those imposed by the Space Shuttle 
vehicle and its systems, the mission and associated policies 
under which the flights were to be conducted, the USAF, 
the user community, and the state of technology as described 
previously. Many features or aspects of the system derived 
from experience on previous space programs, from the 
results of in-house NASA and contractor advanced 
development projects, and, in some cases, from arbitrary 
choices of the design community. Programmatic aspects 
such as cost, schedule, and the need to settle on a baseline 
early in the program also had a strong influence. It is the 
intent in this section to lead the reader through the most 
significant portions of this design process. In the discussion 
to follow, the top-level mechanization drivers which dictated 
the basic system architecture and design approach are 
addressed first. Then, the major tradeoffs or design issues 
which led to the particular mechanization aspects or 
important features of the system are examined. 
Top-Level Design Drivers/Requirements 
Design drivers which affected or forced the overall system 
architecture and approach can be grouped into two 
categories: mission derived and vehicle derived. In the 
following subsections, each of these categories is explored 
and linked to a particular aspect or aspects of the system. 
Mission-Derived Requirements 
The basic Space Shuttle mission consists of lift-off from 
the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center or from 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, ascent and insertion into low 
Earth orbit, performance of operations in support of various 
payloads, and descent to an unpowered landing on a 4572- 
meter (15 000 foot) runway. The significant differences 
between the Space Shuttle mission and those of previous 
programs include the requirement for much more complex 
and extensive on-orbit operations in support of a much 
wider variety of payloads and the requirement to make 
precisely controlled, unpowered, runway landings. These
requirements, coupled with the longstanding NASA rule 
that a mission must be aborted unless at least two means 
of returning to Earth safely are available, had a profound 
effect on the design approach. In previous programs, the 
concept of safe return could be reduced to a relatively simple 
process; i.e., managing a parachute landing in the ocean 
in the vicinity of recovery forces. Therefore, relatively simple 
backup systems were devised; these systems had severely 
degraded performance compared to the primary operational 
system but complied with the mission rule. In the Space 
Shuttle mission, however, the entry through final approach 
and landing maneuvers impose a performance requirement 
on the onboard systems as severe as that of any mission 
phase; therefore, backup systems with degraded perform-
ance were not feasible. Further, the economic impact of 
frequently aborted missions on a user-intensive program 
such as Space Shuttle made a system which dictated an 
abort after one failure completely unacceptable. Therefore, 
a comprehensive fail operational/ fail safe (FO/ FS) system 
requirement was imposed. This requirement meant that the 
avionics system must remain fully capable of performing 
the operational mission after any single failure and fully 
capable of returning safely to a runway landing after any 
two failures. The FO/ FS requirement and the incapability 
of degraded backup systems to achieve a safe return dictated 
the use of multiple avionics "strings," each independent 
from a reliability standpoint but each with equivalent 
capability. 
Another design constraint, derived from experience on 
previous programs, severely limited the use of built-in test 
equipment (BITE) as a means of component failure 
detection. Many cases of failures in the BITE circuitry, 
leading to false conclusions about the operability of a unit, 
had been experienced. The much preferred, and Space 
Shuttle selected, method of fault detection was to compare 
actual operational data produced by a device or subsystem 
with similar data produced by devices or subsystems 
operating in parallel and performing the same function. 
A minimum of three strings is required to guarantee the 
identification of a diverging or disabled unit using this 
comparison process, and a fourth string is needed to 
accommodate a second failure in the same area. The 
combination of this fault detection, isolation, and 
reconfiguration (FDIR) approach and the FO/FS 
requirement led to the quadruple redundancy which is 
prevalent in much of the Space Shuttle avionics system.
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A third mission-derived requirement which had a 
systemwide impact was autonomous operation, mandated 
by the USAF and established as a design goal by NASA 
to decrease operational costs by reducing the dependence 
on ground support. To manage Space Shuttle systems 
onboard required that much of the subsystem telemetry 
data, which had been sent only to the ground on previous 
programs, be processed and provided to the crew in 
appropriate, usable forms. Because of the complexity and 
size of the system, many of the onboard system management 
functions had to be automated to a significant degree and 
mechanized with an appropriate mix of crew involvement, 
assessment, and required action, depending on the mission 
phase and associated workload. 
Vehicle-Derived Requirements 
The Space Shuttle is made up of four separate and distinct 
physical elements: the Orbiter (including the Space Shuttle 
main engines), the external tank (El'), and two solid rocket 
boosters (SRB's). These elements are arranged for lilt-off 
in a side-by-side configuration, in contrast to the vertical 
launch stack of the Apollo and other previous spacecraft. 
Because only the Orbiter is totally recoverable, most of 
the avionics equipment is contained in this element, 
although some flight control sensors and control effectors 
are located in the SRB's. 
The Space Shuttle vehicle is an unstable airframe which 
cannot be flown manually even for short periods during 
either ascent or entry aerodynamic flight phases without 
full-time flight control stability augmentation. This factor 
excluded any possibility of unaugmented, direct flight 
control approaches, either mechanical or fly-by-wire. 
Although briefly considered for postentry aerodynamic 
flight control early in the program, cable/ hydraulic boost 
systems were quickly eliminated because of weight 
considerations and mechanization difficulties, and an 
augmented fly-by-wire approach was baselined. Analog 
augmentation devices were also considered early in the 
program, particularly for entry; however, the wide spectrum 
of control required and the need to readily adapt to 
performance changes as the vehicle evolved discouraged 
their use. Digital flight control systems had been used with 
great success in the Apollo Program, and, although no 
aircraft system had been flown with one at the time, NASA 
was well aware of the advantages of such a system and 
chose digital flight control as the Space Shuttle baseline. 
The full-time augmentation requirement, however, placed the 
digital flight control computation system in the safety-critical 
path and dictated quadruple redundancy in this area. 
The control authority necessary to meet all the Space 
Shuttle vehicle requirements, particularly during ascent and 
entry, resulted in a situation in which a control actuator 
hardover command, issued erroneously, could cause
structural failure and the loss of the vehicle if the command 
was allowed to remain in effect for as little as 10 to 400 
milliseconds (depending on the mission phase). Figure 3-
I illustrates the problem for one point during entry. This 
situation affected the design in at least two important ways. 
First, it imposed a requirement for actuator hardover 
prevention no matter what the failure condition. Second, 
because of the reaction time required, it removed the crew, 
and any reliance on direct manual intervention, from 
consideration in the failure reaction process and dictated 
a fully automatic redundancy faultdown approach. The 
concept which emerged to prevent hardovers was to use 
hydraulic actuators with multiple command inputs to the 
secondary stage as shown in figure 3-2. These secondary-
stage inputs were hydraulically force-summed and the 
resultant command was sent to the primary or power 
actuator. If one of the inputs diverged from the rest (such 
as in the case of an erroneous hardover command), the 
effect of its secondary-stage output was overpowered by 
the other secondary-stage outputs and the control effector 
responded correctly. To make such a system work, however, 
multiple, independently computed commands to the 
secondary actuator inputs had to be provided, or some 
other scheme to carry the hardover prevention forward 
in the system had to be devised. 
The multiple, independent command technique which 
was eventually baselined is shown in figure 3-3. It relied 
on parallel, multiple-string operation and tight synchro-
nization of the entire system to prevent divergence of the 
commands. This approach was considered, initially at least, 
to be excessively complex and difficult to verily; therefore, 
several alternate approaches were investigated and 
eventually discarded. 
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One technique examined (fig. 3-4) would have used an 
active/standby approach with the active string supplying 
commands to all actuator inputs. An independent g-limiter 
and associated switch would be used to detect a structure-
endangering situation and call for a manual or automatic 
switchover to a hot standby string. Several studies were 
conducted using this technique, which appeared promising 
at first, but it was eventually discarded because a number 
of problems were encountered. These included mechani-
zation difficulty and the fact that the measurement cues 
varied throughout and between mission phases. 
A second, also initially promising technique investigated 
is shown in figure 3-5. Using this approach, the independent 
strings would have operated in parallel, but very loosely 
coupled, with each operating on independent sensor data 
and each independently issuing commands to one of the 
actuator ports. Long-term divergence between systems 
would be prevented by periodically exchanging state vectors 
or other slowly varying information. Any short-term inner 
loop flight control command divergence would be 
compensated for with equalization in the actuator 
servomechanisms. This technique appeared feasible but was 
eventually discarded because its mechanization was very 
dependent on exact knowledge of vehicle characteristics 
and these, at the time, were in a constant state of flux. 
Further, no guarantee could be made that some future
vehicle modification would not perturb this concept 
unacceptably. Therefore, the current baseline endured, 
including multiple, active string operation with each string 
closely coupled and synchronized to prevent divergence of 
secondary actuator output commands. 
Precise vehicle sequencing requirements also drove the 
system toward coupled, synchronized digital operation. 
These sequences included events such as Space Shuttle main 
engine (SSME) and SRB ignition, launch pad release and 
lift-off operations, SRB and ET stage separation, etc. These 
events are of the type which must occur within milliseconds 
of the correct time, but must absolutely be prevented from 
occurring at any other time. The baseline system approach, 
defined previously for flight control, also served the 
sequencing requirements for multiple, independent, 
simultaneous inputs and properly timed arm and fire 
sequences. 
The large size of the vehicle also had an impact on the 
avionics system configuration. Because sensors, control 
effectors, and associated devices would be distributed all 
over the vehicle, the weight of the wire required to carry 
all the signals and commands necessary for operation of 
all system elements became a significant factor. Therefore, 
the use of multiplexed digital data buses was investigated 
and baselined. In addition, similar considerations led to 
the baselining of remote power control devices in lieu of 
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dedicated in-line circuit breakers in the crew cockpit area. 
In summary, the mission- and vehicle-derived require-
ments included the following. 
• No degraded backup systems 
• A fail operational/ fail sale approach 
• Use of operational data to detect and isolate failures 
• Quadruple redundancy to isolate a second failure 
• Automatic failure detection and recovery for time-
critical functions 
• Full-time digital flight control 
• Data buses and remote power control devices to save 
weight 
• Onboard access to and analysis of subsystem data 
for autonomy 
Data Processing 
As indicated in section 2, the state of technology in the 
early seventies severely limited the choices available in the 
data processing area. In the early stages of Space Shuttle 
development, a number of computer configurations were 
considered including options by which flight control was
segregated from guidance and navigation; the guidance, 
navigation, and control (GN&C) function was separated 
from other data processing system (DPS) functions; or 
aerodynamic ascent/entry and space-flight functions were 
mechanized in different machines. The considerations 
discussed previously, which led to a tightly coupled, 
synchronized FO/ FS computation requirement for flight 
control and sequencing functions, drove the system toward 
a four-machine computer complex. The difficulties involved 
in attempting to interconnect and operate multiple 
complexes of machines, possibly of different types and 
numbers, drove the configuration toward a single complex 
with central, integrated computation. A fifth machine was 
added in the final configuration, primarily because of 
uncertainty as to the future computation requirements 
which might be placed on the system. Initially, this computer 
was to be used to off-load nonessential mission applications, 
payload, and system management tasks from the other four. 
As will be seen, however, the fifth machine eventually 
became the host for the backup system flight software. 
The size of the Space Shuttle computer memory to be 
baselined was significantly at issue in the beginning, with 
estimates running as low as 24k 32-bit words (k = 1024). 
Sixty-four thousand words of memory were eventually 
selected as the maximum which could be reasonably 
included considering the state of the art of computer design 
State vector 
AxthannA 
FIGURE 3-5.—Parallel string approach.
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and vehicle weight, power, and thermal constraints. 
Memory limitations were a continuing problem throughout 
the early development phases and, as soon as technology 
permitted, the size was increased to 104k. 
The program participants unanimously agreed that atop-
down, structured methodology was the proper design 
approach for the Space Shuttle onboard software; however, 
the use of a high-order language and the selection of an 
operating system approach were subjects of significant 
controversy. The NASA had contracted for the develop-
ment of HAL! 5, a high-order language tailored specifically 
for aerospace avionics applications, but the capability of 
it, or any other high-order language, to produce code with 
size, efficiency, and speed comparable to those of an 
assembly language program was questioned. The issue was 
resolved alter a competition, in which representative 
software routines were coded by different teams - one 
using HAL/S; the other, assembly language - showed 
that the approximate 10 percent loss in efficiency resulting 
from the use of the high-order language was insignificant 
when compared to the advantages of increased programmer 
productivity, program maintainability, and visibility into 
the software. Therefore, the use of HAL/S was baselined 
for all software modules except the operating system. 
The operating system approaches in contention were a 
synchronous concept and a concept in which an asynchro-
nous, priority-driven scheme was used. The synchronous 
approach afforded repeatability, predictability, and 
visibility into system operations, all attributes which ease 
testing and verification, but at the expense of adaptability 
for future growth. The asynchronous concept would readily 
accommodate growth but was more difficult to verify 
because it was not as predictable or repeatable. The concept 
that was finally baselined for the primary system software 
was a hybrid approach which incorporated a synchronous 
foreground executive structure and an asynchronous 
priority-driven background. This approach was considered 
to be more readily adaptable to any future requirements 
which might arise. 
As indicated previously, data buses were baselined for 
Space Shuttle vehicle internal signal transmission; however, 
a number of design issues remained to be settled in this 
area. Based on advanced development work performed in 
NASA laboratories, a hall-duplex, biphase Manchester 
code, I-megabit data bus transmission technique had been 
selected but questions were raised as to the reliability of 
such a system to handle critical messages. Techniques for 
enhancing message correctness statistics were considered 
including the use of error-detecting codes such as Bose-
Chaudhuri-Hocquenghen (BCH) and an echo or answering 
concept. Alter an analysis of the predicted word and bit 
error rates indicated that the basic system coding and 
message protocol would provide more than adequate signal 
reliability, an approach without additional protection was
baselined for all buses except those which interfaced with 
the main engine computers. (A design which used the BCH 
error-detecting code had already been baselined for this 
interface.) To ensure continued emphasis on performance 
in this critical area, the data buses and bus interface devices 
were procured as an integrated system from a single vendor. 
All other vendors whose subsystems used the data bus 
system were furnished these standard interfacing devices 
and required to install them in their line-replaceable units 
(LRU's). 
The number of computer input/output (I/O) ports and 
associated data buses, and their functional allocation, was 
also the subject of much discussion in the early design phase. 
The total system bus traffic density could only be grossly 
estimated initially, and, because of the catastrophic effects 
on the system of reaching or exceeding the 1-Mbit/ sec bus 
limits, provisions for significant growth had to be included. 
The uncertainty in this area and the desire for functional 
isolation resulted in the baseline 24-bus port configuration, 
the maximum number which could reasonably be 
accommodated in the computer I/O processor. Allocation 
of these buses was based on a combination of factors 
including criticality, frequency of use, traffic density, and 
similarity of usage or function. 
A summary of baselined requirements and approaches 
covered in this section includes 
• A central five-computer complex 
• A 64k memory size 
• A top-down, structured approach to software design 
• Use of HAL/S high-order software language 
• An asynchronous, hybrid operating system approach 
• A standardized data bus system procured as a system 
from a single vendor, with no Hamming-type error 
protection 
• A 241/0 port and bus system, with functions allocated 
by criticality and use 
Flight Control 
The circumstances which resulted in the choice of digital 
fly-by-wire control and the limitations on the use of manual 
direct modes have been described previously. Some other 
flight control areas which were at issue during the design 
phase included the following: 
• Pilot/system response requirements and handling 
qualities 
• Digital autopilot sampling rates and transport lags 
• Sensor and actuator redundancy and location 
• Entry gain scheduling, moding, and reconfiguration 
• Autoland 
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Specifications, requirements, and extensive treatments of 
response characteristics which would provide desired 
handling qualities for all types of aircraft were available 
in the Space Shuttle design era, but all dealt with 
conventionally powered aircraft operating in the subsonic 
or low-supersonic flight regimes. No specifications which 
treated the requirements for an unpowered aircraft 
operating over the entire orbital entry through landing 
envelope were available. In an attempt to establish an 
integrated set of such requirements, NASA convened a 
Space Shuttle Flying Qualities Symposium in early 1971 
to solicit industrywide inputs and recommendations. These 
were subsequently published in a Space Shuttle Flying 
Qualities Specification and used as a guideline throughout 
the system development. 
Some of the choices which directly affected the 
performance and stability of the control system included 
the selection of digital autopilot sampling rates and the 
minimum time delay or transport lag allowable between 
the receipt of inputs from manual controls and vehicle 
motion sensors and the issuance of commands to the control 
effectors. Because these factors were also fundamental 
drivers in the software design, particularly on the operating 
system, the selections had to be made very early in the 
program, well before substantive data on airframe 
performance and response characteristics became available. 
The digital autopilot experience base at the time was limited 
to that represented by the Apollo spacecraft, a vehicle which 
had no aircraft characteristics; therefore, the tendency was 
to take a conservative approach and set the sample rates 
very high —50 and 100 hertz were typical values proposed. 
Because rates of this order would have imposed a severe 
strain on the computer/ software complex, the pressure from 
the data processing community was to lower them as much 
as possible. The rate finally chosen was 25 hertz, the same 
as for Apollo, with a transport lag limit of 20 milliseconds, 
values which preliminary analysis indicated would provide 
for the required phase stabilization margins. 
The flight control sensors installed in the Orbiter included 
rate gyros mounted on the aft payload bay bulkhead and 
body-axis-oriented accelerometers located in the forward 
avionics bays. The system was configured initially with three 
of each, with the tiebreaker in the event of a second failure 
to be calculated using data from the inertial measurement 
units (IMU's), which were located in front of the forward 
bays. This concept proved unworkable for the rate gyros 
because the distance between the IMU's and the rate gyros 
and the structural dynamics involved prevented accurate 
transfer of the inertial data. The IMU outputs were also 
initially baselined to break a tie between diverging signals 
from the body-mounted accelerometers. Again, the concept 
proved unworkable even though the instruments were 
located in the same vicinity, and a fourth string of each 
sensor was eventually incorporated.
It was also difficult to find an acceptable location for 
the rate gyros in both the Orbiter and the SRB's. An ideal 
location would have been at the center of gravity, mounted 
on structure the motion of which represented the true rigid-
body rotation about that point. The nearest viable structure 
which reasonably approximated these conditions was the 
aft bulkhead of the payload bay. Therefore, the initial 
location of the rate gyro assembly was a mount on each 
of the four corners of this bulkhead, physically separated 
as much as possible for redundancy isolation. Subsequent 
ground vibration tests uncovered local resonances which 
made these locations unacceptable. The mounting location 
was changed twice before the present position at the center 
base of the bulkhead finally proved acceptable. The desire 
for physical separation of the redundant sensors was 
abandoned in favor of dynamically identical signals to avoid 
compromising the redundancy management selection logic. 
The rate gyro mounts in the SRB's also had to be modified 
after vibration tests uncovered unpredicted structural 
modes. 
The hydraulic actuators used to position the engine 
gimbals and the aerodynamic control surfaces were triply 
redundant input port devices in the initial baseline. It proved 
to be very difficult to interconnect four computer-generated 
commands to a three-port actuator in a manner which 
would preserve the FO/FS requirement. The most 
straightforward solution was to mechanize four input ports 
and this configuration was eventually selected. 
Design of the entry flight control system was a long 
and difficult process. The Orbiter requirement was unique 
in the high-performance aircraft development process in 
that the entire dynamic range of the vehicle from hypersonic 
through subsonic speeds would be encountered on the first 
orbital flight. In contrast, in the normal aircraft 
development approach, the flight envelope is gradually 
expanded in small, carefully controlled steps. The process 
was complicated by large data base uncertainties in 
predicted aerodynamic performance, including control 
surface effectiveness and other key parameters; in structural 
bending information; and in potential interaction between 
the RCS thrusters and the aerodynamic control surfaces. 
The control concept which evolved used RCS thrusters 
exclusively during very early entry, then gradually blended 
in the aerodynamic control surfaces as they became effective 
- first roll, then pitch, then yaw - until approximately 
Mach 3.5, when the thrusters were totally deactivated. 
Transitions between control laws, gain changes, etc., 
required because of the wide dynamic range, were scheduled 
on the assumption of best estimates of vehicle control 
response and performance obtained from the data base, 
using cues such as altitude, drag, and Mach number derived 
from the navigation and air data subsystems. Because of 
the data base uncertainties and because the systems used 
for cues had not yet been flight qualified (e.g., the air data 
FE
SPACE SHUTTLE AVIONICS SYSTEM 
system in particular was subject to large calibration 
uncertainties), a means for reacting in real time to off-
nominal performance had to be provided to the crew. Three 
switches were installed for this purpose, each affording the 
opportunity to modify the system if anomalous performance 
was encountered. One switch opened the automatic 
guidance loop and reduced the flight control system gain 
by 6 decibels. Another selected a control law which did 
not require the use of yaw thrusters. The third provided 
the option of causing the transition from high to low angle 
of attack to occur either earlier or later than nominal. 
Backup System 
As indicated previously, the Space Shuttle mission was not 
amenable to degraded backup system mechanizations, and, 
initially, no backup to the four-computer, four-string, FO/ 
FS avionics configuration was included. Eventually, 
however, considerations of potential generic software errors 
which could affect all four computers, and concern over 
the complexity of the primary system with its closely 
coupled, tightly synchronized approach forced a new look 
at the possibility of a backup. Constraints imposed on this 
investigation were that a backup system should in no way 
degrade the reliability or performance of the primary 
system, and that no significant crew training impact should 
result from the mechanization. The result was a concept 
which used the fifth computer, loaded with unique, 
independently developed and coded software capable of 
safe vehicle recovery and continuation of ascent or safe 
return from any mission situation. A redundant, manual 
switching concept was devised by which control of all 
required data buses, sensors, effectors, and displays was 
transferred to the single backup computer. 
Redundancy Management 
The Space Shuttle Program pioneered the development 
of modern redundancy management techniques and 
concepts. Although previous space programs used backup 
systems, they were usually dissimilar and generally degraded 
in performance with respect to the prime system. The 
mission dynamics for the vehicles in these programs were 
such that active! standby operation with manual switching 
was adequate. Virtually all system functional assessment 
was performed on the ground using telemetry data. Only 
information required for immediate switchover decisions 
or other such actions was presented to the crew. The Space 
Shuttle system, however, presented a much different 
situation to the designer. The FO/ FS requirement, the drive 
toward onboard autonomy, and the rapid reaction times 
which prohibited manual assessment and switching were 
factors that had never before been seriously considered. 
In addition, the avionics system was required, for the first
time, to assess the performance and operational status of 
and to manage the redundancy included in nonavionics 
subsystems such as propulsion, environmental control, and 
power generation. As might be expected in such a situation, 
numerous design issues arose, a number of false design 
starts had to be overcome, and a process thought initially 
to be relatively simple proved to be extremely complex 
and troublesome. Many of these issues are discussed in 
other sections as part of the treatment of individual 
subsystems and functions. Only the more general, 
comprehensive topics are included here. 
The initial concept for managing redundant units was 
simply to compare redundant data, discard any input which 
diverged beyond an acceptable threshold, and select the 
middle value if there were three good inputs (or the average 
if only two were available). The keyword in this sentence 
is "simply," for virtually nothing proved to be simple or 
straightforward in this process. First, measures had to be 
taken to ensure that the data set to be compared was time 
homogeneous, that each value was valid from a data bus 
communication aspect, and that the data were valid in the 
sense of a tactical air navigation (tacan) lockon. The 
selection process had to be capable of correctly handling 
four, three, two, or even single inputs, and of notifying 
the user modules or programs of the validity of the resultant 
output. The fault-detection process had to minimize the 
probability of false alarms while maximizing the probability 
of detecting a faulty signal; these two totally contradictory 
and conflicting requirements made the selection of the 
threshold of failure extremely difficult. The fault isolation 
and recovery logic had to be capable of identifying a faulty 
unit over the complete dynamic range to be experienced 
in the data, of accounting for any expected unique or 
peculiar behavior, and of using BITE when faulted down 
to the dual-redundancy level. Finally, the system had to 
accommodate transients, degrade as harmlessly as possible, 
and provide for crew visibility and intervention as 
appropriate. 
It soon became apparent that each LRU, subsystem, and 
function would have unique redundancy management 
requirements and would therefore have to be treated 
individually. It also became apparent that, to provide the 
required emphasis and expertise, redundancy management 
would have to be treated as a function and assigned to 
a design group with systemwide responsibility in the area. 
Some of the more difficult design issues faced by this group 
are explored in the following paragraphs. 
As indicated previously, the selection of thresholds at 
which to declare a device disabled proved to be a very 
difficult process. In an attempt to minimize false alarms, 
performance within 3o of normal was established as the 
allowable threshold level for a parameter and X 3cr 
as the allowable difference between compared parameters. 
In most cases, however, the standard deviation u had to 
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be derived analytically either because of insufficient test 
data or because the hardware test program was not 
structured to produce the required information. In some 
other cases, the system performance requirements precluded 
operation with an input at the 3u level and the tolerance 
had to be reduced, always at the risk of increasing the 
false alarm rate. 
Another task that proved difficult was mechanization 
of the fault isolation logic for system sensors such as rate 
gyros which, during the on-orbit phases, normally operated 
close to null. Under these conditions, a failure of a unit 
to the null position was equivalent to a latent failure and 
proved impossible to detect even with quadruple redun-
dancy. It could subsequently result in the isolation of a 
functioning device, or even two functioning devices if two 
undetected null failures occurred. 
The first remedy for this anomaly prevented the 
erroneous isolation but resulted in a significant increase 
in RCS fuel usage, caused by frequent switching between 
selected signals which effectively introduced noise into the 
flight control system. The final solution, which prevented 
the anomalous performance, was immensely more complex 
than was the original "simple" approach. 
The redundancy management design process followed 
initially was to treat each system and function individually, 
tailoring the process to fit, then proceeding on to the next 
area. This compartmentalized approach proved inadequate 
in a number of areas in which the process cut across several 
subsystems, functions, and redundancy structures. A prime 
example is the RCS, which contains propellant tanks, 
pressurization systems, manifolds and associated electrically 
operated valves, and 44 thrusters used for flight control. 
The thrusters are divided into four groups, any two of 
which are sufficient to maintain vehicle control about all 
axes in all flight conditions. The other components (tanks, 
manifolds, valves, etc.) are also structured for fault 
tolerance. Each of the thruster groups and associated 
manifold valves is managed by one of the four redundant 
avionics strings. Layered on top of this already complex 
structure are the three electrical power buses, which 
distribute power throughout the system; the dual 
instrumentation system, which contains a number of the 
sensors that provide insight into certain aspects of system 
operation; and the displays and controls required for crew 
monitoring and management. The redundancy manage-
ment logic must detect and isolate thrusters that are failed 
off, failed on, and leaking. Depending on the type of failure 
detected, the system must command appropriate manifold 
valves to prevent loss of propellant or any other dangerous 
condition. 
Obviously, a compartmentalized approach to the 
redundancy management design would have been inade-
quate for this system. Even with the comprehensive 
approach, employed by the task group in an attempt to
cover all aspects of system operation, the design has been 
repeatedly refined and augmented as ground test and flight 
experience uncovered obscure, unanticipated failure modes. 
Onboard System Management 
One of the goals of the Space Shuttle Program was to 
lower operating costs by eventually reducing the size and 
scope of the ground support team required, in all previous 
programs, to monitor and assess spacecraft and subsystem 
performance and functionality. To accomplish this goal, 
however, meant that major portions of a task, hitherto 
performed by hundreds of specialized experts, would have 
to be performed onboard by a relatively small crew already 
busy with mission operations and experiment support. A 
major challenge facing the Space Shuttle designers, 
therefore, was to devise an approach which would 
accommodate the onboard system management require-
ment but which would not overwhelm the flightcrew. 
Further, the design would have to provide initially for full 
ground support capability with an orderly transition of 
the function onboard as the capability became validated 
by flight experience. 
It quickly became obvious that the only way to avoid 
overtaxing the crew would be to automate much of the 
system monitoring and assessment task. Because the 
computational requirements could only be grossly estimated 
initially, the capability of the central computer complex 
to assimilate the load was questioned. Therefore, a tradeoff 
study was conducted to determine the relative merits of 
an integrated approach versus a separate, independent 
computer dedicated to system management. A corollary 
issue involved the data acquisition process. On previous 
programs, only that information required by the crew to 
operate the spacecraft or to respond to emergencies was 
made available onboard; the rest was reduced and analyzed 
on the ground. The traditional approach to onboard 
instrumentation was to install a network of sensors, 
transducers, pickoffs, and signal conditioners together with 
a telemetry processor, which acquired, formatted, and 
multiplexed data for transmission to the ground. The data 
set thus acquired contained all of the information required 
to perform a system assessment, but, because the 
instrumentation network was overlayed on and essentially 
independent of the onboard operating systems, many of 
the measurements were accessible only on the ground. For 
the Space Shuttle, provisions had to be made to make 
all required data accessible onboard as well. 
Two computation and data acquisition options were 
examined. (See fig. 3-6.) In alternate 1, the traditional 
instrumentation system was augmented with the necessary 
computational resources to provide an essentially 
independent capability. In alternate 2, the data were 
provided to and assimilated in the operating avionics system 
13
SPACE SHUTTLE AVIONICS SYSTEM 
Communication 
Alternate 1
	
system	
Instrumentation 
Dedicated	 System  PCM sensors/signal 
display	 conditionerscomputer	 u 
Downlink 
data only  
General-
purpose 
displays
Avionics
system
computers
Operational sensors/ 
effectors 
Communication 
Alternate 2	 H	 system 
(Baseline)	 I 
PCM	 Instrumentation 
master 
a	
sensors/signal 
unit conditioners 
Dat buffers
 
Downlink	
.4 I	 System management data	 data 
General -
purpose 
displays
Operational sensors! 
effectors 
Avionics
system
computers 
FIGURE 3-6.—System management approaches. 
14
SYSTEM DESIGN EVOLUTION 
and its computer complex. The difficulties involved in 
integrating another computer, the associated controls, and 
the required displays into the system discouraged 
consideration of a separate approach, and the problems 
of providing the necessary additional data to the operating 
system were also difficult to resolve. The design finally 
chosen, alternate 2, was to install data buffers in the 
instrumentation telemetry processors which could be 
accessed by all the central computers and thereby would 
provide a source for those measurements not already 
available in the operating systems. The system management 
function was initially relegated to the fifth computer in 
the central complex, the one not included in redundant-
set operations. As the system matured, however, many of 
the system management functions proved to be critical and 
were transferred to the redundant complex. 
Means for assessing and condensing the information into 
a reasonable set which could be readily assimilated and 
acted on by the crew remained as another issue. Critical-
function management was incorporated into the redundant 
set, and automatic failure detection and response were 
mechanized where appropriate. 
Overall system monitoring was accomplished by 
comparing the sensed valued of selected measurements 
against preset upper and lower limits, and, depending 
on the urgency, either switching to an alternate path or 
annunciating the situation to the crew for appropriate 
action. Cathode-ray-tube (CRT) display pages devised for 
each subsystem provided quick and concise monitoring 
capability. Other crew assistance features which were 
considered included switch monitoring to assure that the 
correct system mode and configuration for a given 
operational situation were established, communications 
antenna management controllable either from the ground 
or onboard to ensure optimum coverage with minimum 
crew involvement, and an extensive caution and warning 
system to provide alerts for any abnormal situation. 
Navigation 
Several issues and design choices were addressed in 
arriving at the Space Shuttle navigation system baseline. 
One of the most controversial was the selection of an 
inertial measurement system. The two options considered 
were a system with triply redundant, mechanically 
gimballed platforms, and a strapdown approach, which 
included six skewed gyro/ accelerometer pairs oriented to 
provide multiple fault detection and isolation capability. 
At the time, several gimballed systems that could meet 
Space Shuttle requirements with some modification were 
in production. Although no six-gyro strapdown systems 
were in production, one existing design was fairly mature, 
and this approach appeared to offer significant advantages 
from a system redundancy aspect. The final selection of
a gimballed system was based on such factors as maturity, 
the number of near-production designs available, and the 
predicted cost of the respective gyros. 
Triple redundancy was baselined in this area because 
early analyses indicated that a system with three IMU's 
could achieve full FO/ FS fault tolerance. The first failure 
in such a system would be detected and isolated in the 
standard manner by comparisons among the three units. 
The scheme proposed to isolate the second failure is shown 
in simplified, two-dimensional form in figure 3-7. It 
involved skewing the inertial platform alignment of each 
unit with respect to the others so that each gyro and 
accelerometer in the system would sense inputs, about or 
along a unique axis. By this means, an input sensed by 
a single gyro or accelerometer in one platform could be 
compared with a composite value constructed from 
components along the same axis sensed by a combination 
of instruments in the other platform. By making a series 
of such comparisons with different combinations of 
sensors, it appeared possible to identify a malfunctioning 
instrument. As the system matured, however, and analyses 
and test data accrued, it became apparent that certain 
obscure failures at the dual-redundancy level could not 
be isolated. Therefore, a number of attempts were made 
to raise the redundancy level to four. The problem was 
complicated, however, by the fact that the IMU's and 
the star trackers used for their alignment had to be 
mounted on a common, rigid structural member in a 
location which would provide the required optical look 
angles and adequate clearance for doors and associated 
mechanisms. The location which had been chosen, just 
Equivalent sensed 
rotation about Xl 
4r________•	
X2+2 
X2 
111^/ Y-2 
IMU1	 IMU2 
FIGURE 3-7.—Skewed IMU approach. 
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forward of the cockpit with the star tracker door openings 
in the upper left area of the fuselage, was optimum but 
unfortunately did not contain enough volume to 
accommodate a fourth unit of the size then available. 
One alternate location, on the upper corners of the 
forward payload bay bulkhead, was briefly examined but 
discarded because of alignment problems and the 
difficulty in providing an adequate structural mount. 
Another alternative, in which an additional IMU would 
have been mounted inverted under the existing structure, 
would have forced the relocation of other equipment with 
excessive cost. Therefore, the decision was made to keep 
the triply redundant baseline but to make every attempt 
to reduce the probability of exposure to a second failure 
to an acceptable level. One measure taken was to exploit 
the use of IMU BITE to the maximum. This measure 
alone provided the capability to detect as many as 90 
percent of all failures. Another technique, used during 
entry, was to integrate rate gyro outputs to provide an 
additional attitude reference. The result, when considered 
in terms of the relatively short periods of exposure during 
ascent and entry and of the remote possibility that a second 
failure would be of the precise type which would escape 
detection, was considered to be a safe and satisfactory 
system. 
The selection of an on-orbit navigation system also 
proved to be a difficult process especially in view of the 
Orbiter autonomy requirement. No operational sensor or 
system which could meet accuracy, coverage, and 
autonomy requirements was available. The Department 
of Defense (DOD) Global Positioning System (GPS) was 
only in the initial phase of development, and no assurance 
could then be given that the project would be completed. 
Several other concepts were investigated, including one 
called the precision ranging system (PRS), which would 
have used onboard distance measuring devices operating 
with a network of transponders distributed on the ground 
at strategic locations around the world and in the vicinity 
of the landing sites. Several studies conducted showed 
that, given the required number and locations of 
transponders, a PRS could easily meet all Space Shuttle 
navigation accuracy requirements. To adopt such a 
system, however, meant that NASA would have to install 
and maintain the dedicated worldwide network. 
In another concept, the RF emissions from ground-
based radars located around the world would have been 
tracked to obtain angular data from which a state vector 
could have been constructed. This system also had promise 
but would have required the development of onboard 
electronics equipment which was extremely sophisticated 
for the time. The technique finally chosen was to make 
the ground-Orbiter-ground communications link coherent 
and thereby to provide the capability to precisely measure 
the Doppler shift in the carrier frequency and to obtain
an accurate time history of relative range rate between 
the spacecraft and a ground station. From this informa-
tion, the vehicle state vector could be constructed. The 
system was originally mechanized so that the Doppler 
information could be extracted both on the ground and 
onboard. Later in the program, the ground was made 
prime for on-orbit navigation and the onboard capability 
was deleted. The realization of autonomous on-orbit 
navigation was left to the GPS. 
The issues involved with rendezvous navigation 
concerned both performance and mechanization. No 
definitive rendezvous targets or their characteristics 
existed; therefore, radar performance requirements were 
difficult to specify. Finally, after much debate, it was 
decided that the capability should be provided to acquire 
range and angle data from both cooperative and 
uncooperative targets and that the performance should 
be that reasonably available from state-of-the-art solid-
state devices. The mechanization finally chosen was to 
incorporate the radar in the Ku-band communications 
system, which required a high-gain directable antenna and 
other components which could service both radar and 
communications functions. 
The system selected to provide navigation for the 
postblackout entry phase was the DOD tactical air 
navigation system network. This choice was made only 
after much deliberation because tacan performance was 
neither documented nor specified above 12.2 to 15.2 
kilometers (40 000 to 50 000 feet) and the Space Shuttle 
requirement extended to an altitude of approximately 42.7 
kilometers (140 000 feet). Analytic performance predic-
tions and laboratory test results indicated that perform-
ance would be satisfactory, however, and three off-the-
shelf transceivers, modified as necessary to interface with 
the onboard data processing system, were baselined. 
Triple redundancy was considered adequate because of 
the short period of exposure and because the ground could 
provide some assistance if two failures occurred. 
The predominant navigation aids in place at the time 
for the final approach and landing phase were the FAA 
ILS and the USAF ground-controlled approach (GCA) 
system; however, both the performance and the coverage 
provided by these systems were deemed inadequate for 
the type of approach to be flown by the Space Shuttle. 
The FAA was considering an upgrade to a precision 
microwave landing system, but no firm schedule existed. 
Precision microwave systems also under development by 
DOD would meet Space Shuttle performance and 
coverage requirements, and a variation of one of these 
was chosen, again modified to interface with the DPS. 
Triple redundancy was considered sufficient for this 
system also, both because of the short exposure and 
because the pilot could take over visually under most 
expected conditions. 
FE1
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Display and Control 
The major challenge facing the designers of the Space 
Shuttle cockpit was to integrate all the controls and 
displays required for operation of the vehicle and its 
subsystems into the space available, within the reach and 
vision of the crew as appropriate for each mission phase. 
Some of the basic requirements imposed were 
• Safe return with a single crewman from either 
forward station 
• Normal operation, except payload management, 
with a crew of two 
• Accessibility from the two forward stations of all 
controls and displays required for ascent and entry 
• Provisions for manual override of automated critical 
functions 
• Crew selection of automatic or manual flight 
guidance and control 
• Means to annunciate faults in and to command safing 
of hazardous systems 
In addition, the system would have to provide for both 
space flight and aircraft aerodynamic flight, a first in the 
manned space program. In the early design phases, the 
controls required for these two flight modes were thought 
to be so incompatible that consideration was given to 
incorporating two separate cockpits, one exclusively 
devoted to and equipped for aerodynamic flight, the other 
for space operations. The program could not afford the 
cost, complexity, and inefficiency of such an approach, 
however, and a single, integrated, two-man forward 
control station was baselined for both regimes. The aft 
portion of the upper cockpit, because of visibility 
advantages looking up, aft, and into the payload bay area, 
was equipped with controls and displays sufficient for 
on-orbit proximity and payload operations. Despite the 
integrated approach, however, dedication of some devices 
to one or the other flight regime could not be avoided. 
The preferred pilot input devices for aerodynamic flight 
were a traditional control stick (or yoke/wheel) and 
rudder pedals. For space flight, three-axis hand controllers 
for attitude and translation control were desired. After 
much deliberation and many simulations, the decision 
was made to adopt a variation of a side-arm controller 
which would provide pitch and roll input capability in 
the aircraft mode and pitch, roll, and yaw inputs in the 
spacecraft mode. These devices were located in the 
standard aircraft position between the pilot's and copilot's 
legs, situated to provide clearance for ejection, a capability 
included on early flights. Rudder/ brake pedals, active 
only in the aerodynamic mode, were included to provide 
yaw inputs and to apply the wheel brakes. Other devices
dedicated to aerodynamic flight included the speed brake 
and body flap controls. A three-axis translation controller 
was included to provide on-orbit maneuver capability. 
Most displays served a dual or universal purpose; 
however, some, such as air data, the radar altimeter, and 
those associated with navigation aids, became active only 
after blackout. 
The display and control concepts proposed very early 
in the program included extensive use of multifunction 
CRT's, reformattable control panels, multipurpose 
keyboards, head-up displays, and limited use of dedicated 
switches and circuit breakers. The technology involved 
was then at the leading edge of the state of the art for 
aerospace systems, however, and, because it appeared that 
more conventional approaches would suffice, the decision 
was made to use off-the-shelf equipment wherever 
possible. The system which evolved, therefore, contains 
an extremely large number and variety of components. 
Control devices include toggle, pushbutton, thumbwheel, 
and rotary switches; potentiometers; keyboards; circuit 
breakers; and hand controllers. Displays include circular 
and vertical meters, tape meters, mechanical talkbacks, 
annunciators, flight control meters, electromechanical 
position and attitude indicators, digital readouts, and 
CRT's. The four CRT's in the final design incorporate 
multifunctionality but to a much smaller degree than those 
in the original concepts. 
Communications 
The Space Shuttle communications design community 
was faced with a variety of requirements, many conflicting, 
and many unique to or faced for the first time in the 
Space Shuttle Program. The network communications 
system had to accommodate voice, command, and data 
traffic with the NASA Ground Spaceflight Tracking and 
Data Network (GSTDN), with the USAF Space Ground 
Link System (SGLS), and with NASA Tracking and Data 
Relay Satellites (TDRS's) in geosynchronous orbit. The 
downlink data to be accommodated ranged from real-
time operational telemetry to television to wide-band 
payload/ experiment data. Because the Orbiter would 
operate as an aircraft in atmospheric flight, the system 
would have to provide for air traffic control (ATC) type 
interfaces from postblackout through landing. Also 
because of the operation in the atmosphere, all antennas 
had to be either flush-mounted under the thermal 
protection system or deployable on orbit and retractable 
for ascent and entry. Other factors which influenced the 
design included requirements for communications 
security, all-attitude operation, coherent Doppler for 
navigation, voice and data links to an extravehicular 
astronaut, text and graphics uplink, active and passive 
tracking of satellites for rendezvous, and extensive remote 
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control capability from the ground to reduce crew 
workload. In addition, the always overriding requirements 
to minimize weight, power, volume, and complexity and 
to use off-the-shelf equipment were present and 
contributed to the system configuration. 
The GSTDN and SGLS networks both operate at S-
band frequencies with direct ground/ spacecraft/ ground 
link performance requirements similar to those encoun-
tered on previous low Earth orbit missions. The TDRS 
operates at both S-band and Ku-band frequencies but 
with much more stringent link performance requirements 
because of the distances, look angles, and dynamics 
involved in operations with a synchronous orbit 
communications terminal. Off-the-shelf S-band trans-
ponders which would have allowed operation with either 
ground network were available, but none could meet the 
TDRS link margin requirements. Because the requirement 
existed for communications coverage during ascent, on-
orbit, and entry phases when out of sight of ground 
stations and operating with the flush-mounted, low-gain 
antennas, the decision was made to develop new S-band 
hardware which would provide for basic operational 
voice/command/telemetry traffic through either ground 
network or the TDRS using an integrated onboard system. 
The basic Space Shuttle operational network commu-
nications requirement called for voice channels (up and 
down), an uplink command channel, a telemetry downlink 
channel, two-way coherent Doppler for ground naviga-
tion, a ground ranging capability, and provisions for 
communications security. The stringent TDRS link 
performance requirements, exacerbated by the low-gain 
antennas, drove the system to an all-digital signal design 
using time-division multiplexing (TDM) to integrate the 
voice and command or data channels into a common 
bit stream. An adaptive delta modulation technique using 
a modified version of the ABATE algorithm was chosen 
to digitize the voice channels after extensive in-house 
laboratory tests showed that this method maintained high 
word intelligibility with reasonable voice quality at 
minimum sampling rates in the presence of very high 
channel errors. To achieve optimum performance on these 
digital channels, a phase modulation (PM) system was 
developed which included one or two voice channels 
multiplexed with an encoded 8-kbps command channel 
on the uplink or with a 128- or 64-kbps pulse code 
modulated (PCM) telemetry bit stream on the downlink. 
To maintain adequate circuit margins and bit error rates 
at these data rates for the Space Shuttle/TDRS link, it 
proved necessary to develop a 100-watt traveling wave 
tube power amplifier transmitter and a low-noise 
preamplifier receiver, both of which pushed the state of 
the art, and to employ sophisticated error-correcting 
channel-encoding techniques. After a series of tradeoff 
studies, convolutional encoding and Viterbi decoding were
selected to optimize the link. Phase-shift keying (PSK) 
was also selected to optimize channel performance with 
a Costas loop to provide for carrier reconstruction and 
data recovery on both forward and return link signals. 
To provide accurate Doppler data which would allow 
the ground control center to determine and maintain the 
Space Shuttle ephemeris, the S-band uplink and downlink 
signals were made coherent. Range tone turnaround was 
incorporated to provide a direct ranging capability at 
GSTDN stations for ascent and postblackout entry state 
vector determination. An additional constraint on the 
system was imposed by international agreements which 
specify the maximum allowable power flux density 
received at the Earth's surface from an orbiting satellite. 
To avoid exceeding this limit on the TDRS to Orbiter 
link, it proved necessary to develop a direct-sequence 
spread-spectrum signal design using pseudorandom noise 
(PN) code modulation. 
The Space Shuttle/ground direct S-band link was also 
required to accommodate wide-band telemetry data from 
the main engines during ascent, data dumps from onboard 
recorders, payload data (analog data up to 4 megahertz, 
digital data up to 5 Mbps), and video from the onboard 
television system. Because these types of data were not 
amenable to incorporation into the limited-rate PCM 
telemetry data stream described previously, a separate 
S-band system was developed for this purpose using 
frequency modulation (FM) and an independent signal 
processor, transmitter, and antennas. 
Initially, the communications and data requirements 
of the payload community were either unknown or 
appeared totally open ended. A major mission of the Space 
Shuttle was to service, deploy, or retrieve a wide, and 
largely unknown and unpredictable, variety of satellites. 
Therefore, it posed a major engineering challenge to 
develop a communications system with some chance of 
longevity which could generate commands having 
payload-compatible formats, data rates, and carrier 
frequencies; monitor telemetry signals having various 
standard formats, data rates, and subcarrier and carrier 
frequencies; and relay nonstandard telemetry to the 
ground without onboard subearrier demodulation and bit 
synchronization. A series of meetings was held in the early 
seventies with various involved government and commer-
cial organizations in an attempt to develop a real and 
manageable set of requirements. This activity culminated 
in a major conference in 1974 at which all prospective 
payload developers were invited to make suggestions as 
to how the Space Shuttle could best serve their needs 
for command and data rates, formats, modulation 
schemes, and carrier and subcarrier frequencies. It soon 
became apparent that, to satisfy the entire community, 
the Space Shuttle would have to provide all the functions 
and capabilities of all the satellite ground stations and 
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support networks developed to that time. Although 
technically feasible, the provision of an essentially open-
ended service would have been prohibitively expensive; 
therefore, the decision was made to provide only normal 
baseband signal processing functions for a limited number 
of modulation schemes, subcarriers, bit rates, and PCM 
formats; and to implement a wide-band, transparent-
throughput, indirect-transmission (bent pipe) capability 
to relay "nonstandard" payload signals through the TDRS 
Ku-band link for ground monitoring and analysis. 
The. requirement for wide-band (50 Mbps) Ku-band 
data transmission through the TDRS dictated the use 
of a high-gain deployable antenna with tracking capability 
over a wide angular range. Early in the design phase, 
it became apparent that this antenna, its control elements, 
and major portions of the associated communications 
hardware could also serve the Orbiter-to-satellite radar 
tracking requirement with significant savings in weight 
for the inconvenience of having to interrupt wide-band 
TDRS communications when performing the radar 
function. This concept was baselined and the combined 
Ku-band radar/ communications system design which 
evolved included an antenna assembly, an antenna 
controller, a transmitter, a receiver, and associated 
microwave components common to both functions. 
USAF Requirements 
The U.S. Air Force requirements which influenced the 
Space Shuttle avionics system design or which raised 
significant design issues included the following: autonomy, 
radiation hardening, and communications and data 
security. The autonomy requirement was defined to be 
the capability to conduct mission operations without 
dependence on ground support systems dedicated only 
to the Space Shuttle. As indicated in previous sections, 
the avionics design which evolved included provisions for 
onboard management of vehicle systems, and, except for 
the lack of an orbital navigation capability, mission 
operations could be conducted as desired. Incorporation 
of an autonomous navigation capability was deferred 
pending the development of the DOD GPS. 
The radiation hardening requirement proved to be 
extremely difficult to quantify in terms of a reasonable 
threat and even more difficult to meet without a 
prohibitive weight penalty. The result was a program 
decision to accept the degree of hardening provided by 
the shielding and other measures which were incorporated 
to protect against lightning strikes. 
The communications and data security requirements 
included transmission and reception of encrypted 
information over the various RF links; processing, storing, 
and general handling of classified, unencrypted data 
onboard the spacecraft; and denial of unfriendly access
or control while conducting classified mission operations. 
(Hereafter, unclassified or encrypted data are defined as 
"black"; classified, unencrypted data are called "red." 
Because classified military and unclassified civilian 
missions were to be interspersed, means had to be provided 
to purge the spacecraft of any residual red data. In 
addition, imposition of the Air Force Tempest Specifi-
cation for prevention of compromise of classified 
information through spurious radiation placed unique 
requirements on the system design. 
Several alternatives were considered, ranging from a 
system which integrated all USAF requirements into the 
basic Orbiter avionics system to one which created a red/ 
black data barrier between the Orbiter avionics and an 
essentially independent USAF system. The system 
baseline that evolved was a hybrid of these extremes which 
incorporated many of the basic requirements in the 
Orbiter system but segregated the unique requirements 
behind a red/black barrier. The transmission/ reception 
requirements were met, as indicated in the Communi-
cations section, by incorporating encryption/ decryption 
devices in the communications system and by providing 
for the necessary authentication protocol. Power, data 
interfaces, and associated wiring were provided between 
the Orbiter system and an area in the mission specialist 
station in which processors, controls, displays, etc., unique 
to a USAF mission could be installed. Wiring dedicated 
to this area was subject to the full Tempest requirement. 
The rest of the Orbiter wiring was required to meet only 
the normal manned-space-flight standards for electromag-
netic interference, etc. Special inhibit switches and 
procedures were installed and used to preclude any 
possibility of hostile takeover or access to classified 
information. Procedures and the necessary associated 
software were incorporated to purge memories, recorders, 
and other portions of the system which could possibly 
retain red data. 
Payload Support 
Because the primary purpose of the Space Shuttle is to 
deliver, recover, and otherwise service a wide variety of 
payloads, high priority was given early in the program 
to incorporating features in the avionics system which 
would support such operations. As indicated in the Data 
Processing section, one of the five computers in the data 
processing complex was originally designated for payload 
support. Even though this machine eventually became 
the residence of the backup system during ascent and 
entry, some payload servicing functions were retained. 
On orbit, where the redundant set was not required and 
only one or two of the machines were needed for Orbiter 
operations, the excess computational capacity was to be 
made available for payload use. The payload major 
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function, one of the three major software partitions, was 
created to assemble all payload support programs. The 
intent was to store these programs in mass memory and 
to load them as appropriate into one of the unused 
computers during the on-orbit phase. Two data buses 
and two multiplexer/demultiplexers (MDM's) were 
allocated to payload services. A version of the MDM 
called a "flex MDM," which could easily be reconfigured, 
was developed especially to accommodate the unique 
interface requirements of various payloads. 
For various reasons, these system features incorporated 
for payload support have not yet been fully exploited. 
The difficulty in deriving or distilling a reasonable set 
of support requirements from the payload community 
was discussed in the Communications section. In addition, 
the rigor required and the cost and lead time involved 
in developing and verifying flight software have 
discouraged any extensive tailoring of programs to specific 
payloads. A standard set of services, largely associated 
with the system management function, has evolved and 
is provided on each flight. These include caution and 
warning, limit sensing and status determination, 
sequencing, and command and telemetry formatting. The 
GNC function provides pointing information and state 
vector data as required. 
Remote Manipulator 
Early in the program, the decision was made to provide 
for control and monitoring of the remote manipulator 
in the Orbiter avionics system. This device, an 18.3-meter 
(60 foot) arm with shoulder, elbow, and wrist joints, is 
designed to insert, remove, and otherwise physically 
manipulate payloads as heavy as 27 216 kilograms 
(60 000 pounds) in and about the payload bay. Because 
of weight constraints, the arm/joint design which evolved 
is a very slow moving system with rigid arm segments 
and joints which can be easily back-driven under load. 
The integrated control dynamics of the combined Orbiter/ 
loaded arm system, particularly the interaction between 
the vehicle control system and that of the manipulator, 
are extremely complex and presented a significant design 
problem. At issue was the degree of integration of the 
two control systems. The approaches considered ranged 
from a single, integrated concept to separate independent 
systems, with or without crosstalk. After much deliber-
ation, the decision was made to make the control systems
and associated software for the Orbiter and manipulator 
independent and to rely on preflight simulations and 
operational procedures to avoid possible adverse 
interactions. 
Another issue was the question of collision avoidance. 
It was possible for the arm, with or without an attached 
payload, to be commanded to a position which could 
impact and potentially damage the Orbiter; therefore, a 
requirement to provide collision detection and prevention 
measures in the software was originally imposed. 
Protection against all the possible combinations of arm 
position and payload geometry proved to be very difficult 
to mechanize without an unacceptable software penalty, 
and the requirement eventually evolved to one which 
called for software reasonableness tests to ascertain that 
no command inconsistent with the crew inputs was being 
transmitted. 
Power Distribution 
The size and complexity of the Space Shuttle vehicle 
forced a number of changes in the approach to power 
distribution and control followed on previous space 
programs. As an example, a single-point ground standard, 
if imposed in the dc distribution system, would have 
resulted in a 2268-kilogram (5000 pound) weight penalty 
and, therefore, had to be relaxed. A multipoint system 
with structure return was used; however, isolation was 
maintained between primary power returns and LRU 
chassis and these returns were brought out to controlled 
points on the fore and aft payload bay bulkheads. Another 
example is the extensive use of remote power controllers 
and computer-controlled load switching, employed both 
to reduce weight and to reduce the crew's workload. 
Other issues faced in the power area included the 
redundancy level of the system and the requirement for 
battery backup to the fuel cells. A three-bus distribution 
system was selected on the basis of both weight and 
reliability considerations. The battery issue was also 
resolved on the basis of weight and reliability. Even the 
minimum loads required for safe return would have 
required a prohibitively heavy battery complex. The 
system which evolved was two-fault tolerant, with 
extensive cross-tie capability and multiple feeds to critical 
LRU's to enhance failure tolerance and to protect against 
transients. 
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Overview 
The Space Shuttle avionics system features a central 
computer complex, which provides software services to all 
vehicle subsystems that require them; a serial digital data 
bus network, which distributes the computer input/output 
(I/O) function throughout the vehicle; and dedicated 
hardware unique to each subsystem. Depending on the 
mission, the system includes more than 274 line-replaceable 
units (LRU's), the term used to describe a case or chassis, 
containing electronic parts, with connectors, and having 
mounting and cooling provisions, which is replaceable as 
an entity in case of failure. These are distributed primarily 
among six equipment bays located in the Orbiter as shown 
in figure 4-1. Some sensors and other LRU's are located 
outside the bays because of unique location constraints 
and some in the solid rocket boosters (S RB's) and the 
external tank (ET). Dually redundant main engine 
controllers are mounted on each of the main engines. Three 
inertial measurement units (IMU's) and two star trackers 
are mounted on alignment pads on the navigation base, 
a rigid structure located just forward of Orbiter equipment 
bays I and 2. To the extent possible, redundant LRU's 
are physically separated to prevent damage to more than 
one string if a problem should occur. The equipment is 
arranged to facilitate checkout and for easy access and 
replacement. Cooling by both forced air and coldplate is 
available in the forward bays. All equipment in the 
unpressurized aft bays is mounted on coldplates. 
Additional detail on the distribution of LRU's is 
contained in the system block diagram, the foldout located 
inside the back cover, which should be extended at this 
time. Because of its size and complexity, the Space Shuttle 
avionics system is very difficult to describe without 
becoming engulfed in details. Therefore, reference to the 
block diagram will be made frequently throughout this 
section in an attempt to maintain overall system perspective. 
The reader is urged to spend a few minutes to become 
familiar with its features. Note that the block diagram is 
organized to reflect the physical location of the avionics 
equipment in the vehicle. To facilitate reference to various 
features of the system, letters (across the top and bottom) 
and numbers (along the sides) define zones in the drawing. 
To the left and outside the drawing is a list of acronyms 
and abbreviations used. Below this list is a legend indicating 
the color codes used to identify data buses.
The crew interface devices are grouped in the flight deck/ 
cockpit area of the diagram, zones [A,l] through [D,7]. 
Below the flight deck is the nose area and along the bottom 
of the drawing is the payload bay, each depicted with the 
LRU's located in that area. The three forward avionics 
bays occupy the center of the drawing; the three aft bays, 
the upper right portions of the drawing. Below the aft bays 
are the left and right SRB's, and the isolation amplifiers 
and umbilicals used to interface with the launch processing 
system (LPS) while on the ground and with the SRB's 
before separation. 
The five central general-purpose computers (GPC's) are 
distributed among the forward avionics bays, zones [E,4] 
through [L,4]. The serial digital data buses, which connect 
the computers into the rest of the system, are located above 
and below the computers and generally run right and left 
across the drawing. They are grouped and color coded 
into categories as listed in the legend. These buses are 
connected to various bus terminal units (BTU's), which 
serve as the interface between the computers and the 
subsystem LRU's. 
The data processing system (DPS) provides services to 
all of the avionics subsystems and functions as shown in 
figure 4-2. Each of the subsystems has unique, dedicated 
hardware, but all associated applications software modules 
are resident in the central computers and all functions use 
features of the DPS. In the following subsections, first, 
the major functions of the avionics system are described 
as they relate to the Space Shuttle mission; then, each 
subsystem or function is discussed together with its unique 
Aft avionics bays 
Forward avionics bays Bay 4	 Bay 5 
Bay 1 Bay 2 Bay 3 
Bay 5 Bay 6 
Navigation base 
MM
Bay 4
Bay 6 
"Bay 3 
1 and 2 
FIGURE 4-1.—Avionics equipment locations. 
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hardware, its integration with the central data processing 
complex, the redundancy features employed, and the 
associated crew interface requirements. 
Avionics System Functions 
The Space Shuttle avionics system is an integral part of 
all mission operations from well before lift-off to after 
landing. In this subsection, these operations are discussed 
from an overall avionics viewpoint in preparation for the 
subsystem and function descriptions which follow. 
Ground Checkout and Prelaunch Operations 
The ground-based launch processing system has primary 
responsibility for all ground checkout and prelaunch 
operations until 30 seconds before lift-off (T - 30). The 
LPS, however, makes extensive use of the onboard system 
both in the actual conduct of tests and in the gathering 
of data pertinent to the operation. A command processor 
called the test control supervisor (TCS) provides the 
capability for ground control. Examples of tests which are 
mechanized largely onboard are the flight readiness test, 
IMU calibration and alignment, dedicated display 
checkout, and various actuator drive tests. At T - 30 
seconds, control of the launch sequence is passed onboard 
and the avionics system has primary responsibility.
Functions performed include final system initialization and 
go/no-go assessment, ignition of the Space Shuttle main 
engines (SSME's) and the SRB's, and the sequence by which 
the vehicle is released from ground attachment. 
Ascent Phase 
The Space Shuttle ascent configuration and the control 
effectors used are shown in figure 4-3. A profile of the 
ascent trajectory is contained in figure 44. All Space Shuttle 
ascent events and dynamic guidance and control are 
provided by the Orbiter avionics flight software. Between 
lift-off and SRB staging, the vehicle is guided by stored 
roll, yaw, and pitch profiles, which adapt for performance 
variations caused by SRB temperature changes. Thrust 
vector control is performed using the three main engines 
on the Orbiter and the two SRB engines. During the 
maximum dynamic pressure region, the SRB thrust is 
programmed by propellant shaping to decrease temporarily, 
and the SSME's are throttled as necessary to prevent 
exceedance of the 3g structural limit. The elevons also are 
adjusted as required to relieve aerodynamic structural loads 
on the Orbiter. After SRB separation, a powered explicit 
guidance algorithm is invoked by which the vehicle is guided 
to the desired trajectory conditions at main engine cutoff 
(MECO). The reaction control system (RCS) thrusters are 
used to control the vehicle after MECO. Separation from 
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FIGURE 4-3.—Ascent control effectors. 
the ET is followed by performance of one or two orbital 
maneuvering system (OMS) translation maneuvers, as 
required, to achieve the final orbit. Abort capabilities exist 
throughout the ascent phase covering contingencies such 
as loss of main engines. Depending on the time of 
occurrence, the abort may require a return to the launch
site, a diversion to a landing in Europe or Africa, a one-
orbit diversion to a landing at Edwards Air Force Base 
or White Sands, or an abort to orbit. In addition to the 
guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) functions 
described previously, the system performs a number of 
critical ascent vehicle management and sequencing services 
including 
• SRB separation and range safety system safing 
• RCS quantity gauging 
• Orbiter vent door control 
• External tank separation 
• Main propulsion system propellant-dump control 
• OMS propellant crossfeed and system reconfiguration 
On-Orbit Phase 
After orbital insertion, the GN&C system maintains Orbiter 
attitude and translation control as required using the RCS 
and OMS capabilities. The IMU's are aligned periodically 
using the star trackers to measure the azimuth and elevation 
of available stars selected from a catalog maintained in 
the software. The GN&C subsystem navigates during the 
orbital phase by propagating the state vector forward using 
the known orbital parameters and any velocity changes 
sensed by the IMU's, including planned maneuvers. 
Active guidance
Time 
FIGURE 4-4.—Ascent trajectory. 
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Periodically, the onboard state vector is updated by the 
ground control network -using the communications uplink. 
Rendezvous guidance and navigation capability is provided 
using the Ku-band radar as the primary external sensor. 
Provisions are included for supplying support information 
to payloads including state vectors, vehicle attitude and 
rate data, and instrument pointing vectors. During the on-
orbit phase, the full redundant-set computer configuration 
normally is not used, and the GN&C functions are 
performed from a dual computer setup. Other avionics 
system services include control of the payload bay door 
open/ close sequences and a number of system monitoring 
and control functions and payload support functions. 
Entry Phase 
The entry phase begins before the performance of the 
deorbit propulsive maneuver and continues down to the 
terminal area energy management (TAEM) interlace at an 
altitude of approximately 25.3 kilometers (83 000 feet) (fig. 
4-5). Attitude control is maintained using the RCS thrusters 
only until the aerodynamic control surfaces become 
effective; then, a blend of aerosurface and RCS control 
is used. The air data probes are deployed following the 
entry heat pulse; thereafter, flight control gains are 
scheduled based on measured air data. The entry guidance 
function modulates angle of attack and bank angle to 
control the Orbiter g-load, heat pulse, and landing footprint. 
/ Entry interface 
122 (400 x
Start blackout 
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Entry navigation is performed using IMU-sensed inputs 
until tactical air navigation (tacan) data become available. 
Before the tacan data are incorporated into the system, 
an accuracy assessment is made on the ground by comparing 
them with radar tracking data. Non-GN&C critical 
functions performed during entry include 
• OMS propellant crossfeed and system reconfiguration 
• RCS propellant quantity gauging 
• Orbiter vent door control 
• OMS/RCS propellant dumps 
TAEM Phase 
The TAEM phase begins at approximately 760 m/ sec (2500 
ft/ sec) entry velocity and continues down to the runway 
approach interface at an altitude of approximately 610 
meters (2000 feet) (fig.4-6). The TAEM guidance algorithm 
steers the vehicle to tangency with a navigation-derived 
heading alignment cylinder projection, which intersects the 
final landing approach trajectory. Energy is controlled by 
performing S-turns and by adjusting speed brakes. Both 
tacan and microwave scanning beam landing system 
(MSBLS) data are used as appropriate for navigation. Non-
GN&C vehicle services include 
• RCS propellant quantity gauging 
• Orbiter vent door control 
Blend roll/pitch RCS/aerodynamic 
End blackout 
Start transition 
300	 600
Blend yaw 
First tan ca	 RCS/aerodynamic 
TAEM update	
MSBLS	 interface 
acquisition 
900	 1200	 1500	 1800 
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Time from entry interface, sec 
FIGURE 4-5.—Entry trajectory. 
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FIGURE 4-6.—Terminal area energy management. 
Approach and Landing Phase 
The final approach trajectory is shown in figure 4-7. The 
MSBLS and the IMU's serve as the navigation sensors. 
Below an altitude of 1524 meters (5000 feet), radar altimeter 
data are displayed for monitoring purposes. Although full 
autoland capability is available, the normal procedure is 
for the crew to assume manual control before the flare 
maneuver leading to the shallow glideslope. When in 
manual mode, the system continues to compute and display 
steering commands to the desired flightpath. A heads-up 
display (HUD) is used to superimpose trajectory monitoring 
and dynamic flight data on the out-the-window view. Non-
GN&C vehicle services include 
• RCS propellant quantity gauging 
• Orbiter vent door control 
• Landing gear isolation valve control 
General Mission Functions 
In addition to the mission-phase-oriented functions 
described previously, a number of services which apply 
throughout the mission are performed by the avionics 
system. The instrumentation subsystem gathers data from 
all vehicle systems to be used by the onboard system 
management and caution and warning functions and/or 
to be telemetered to the ground support network for 
monitoring and performance evaluation. The communica-
tions subsystem provides a number of services including 
two-way space/ground voice and data links, television, 
intercom, and extravehicular and payload links. These 
services are discussed in the Communications and Tracking 
section. The avionics system also provides distribution and 
control of electrical power for all vehicle systems.
Data Processing 
The data processing complex includes the following key 
features: 
• Five GPC's mechanized in a parallel-redundant digital 
computation system 
• Software programs combined in individual memory 
loads which provide all required subsystem, vehicle, 
and mission services 
• Multiplexed data transmission with standardized 
subsystem interfaces 
• Distributed I/O through remotely located multi-
plexer/demultiplexer (MDM) units 
• Multifunctional cathode-ray-tube (CRT) displays/ 
keyboards 
• Mass program storage in two tape memory units 
Computer Configuration 
The five GPC's are identical IBM AP-10I13 machines. Each 
GPC is packaged in two boxes, one containing the central 
processing unit (CPU) and part of the memory (80k 32-
bit words), the other containing the input/ output processor 
(lOP) and the rest of the memory (24k 32-bit words). A 
GPC upgrade, to the AP-I01S, is currently under way in 
the program. This upgrade will combine the CPU and the 
lOP into one package and increase the memory to 256k. 
All GPC's are wired alike with both discrete and serial 
digital I/O provisions. The discretes are used for computer 
moding, control, synchronization, station identification, 
and redundancy management. Twenty-four serial digital 
ports provide the interfaces with the rest of the avionics 
system. Each port has a bus control element (BCE), which 
is under software control and which can be individually 
enabled to transmit and receive on the respective data bus. 
The transmit/ receive configuration of the ports on each 
machine is automatically established by the resident 
Autoland interface 
-20° glideslope 
E0 00 0	 Touchdown 
/ 
12.8 km 
lid	 (6.9 n. mi.) 
FIGURE 4-7.—Final approach. 
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software, using the station identification discretes and other 
information to determine its location or slot. It is possible, 
however, to reconfigure ports and GPC string assignments 
manually to accommodate failures. The function, the 
authority, and the capability of a GPC at any given point 
in the mission are established by the applications software 
resident in the machine. For example, if a computer is 
loaded with a GN&C (ascent, on-orbit, entry) program, 
it will assume control of the bus ports assigned to its slot 
to obtain access to flight control sensor data and to provide 
a command path to the required control effectors. 
During dynamic phases of the mission, such as ascent 
and entry, four of the machines are loaded with the same 
software and operate in a "redundant set," with each 
assigned a set of data buses giving control of a set of sensors 
and control effectors. The fifth GPC is loaded with a backup 
program capable, when selected, of communicating on all 
buses to provide for mission completion or safe return from 
any point in the mission. To prevent divergence while 
operating in a redundant set, it has proven necessary both 
to synchronize the processes within the machines and to 
provide them with identical input data. The synchronization 
(synch) technique mechanized uses "synch points" inserted 
at appropriate locations in the software. When a synch 
point occurs, each computer stops execution, notifies the 
other machines by way of synch discretes that it is ready 
for synchronization, and waits for receipt of corresponding 
synch discretes from the rest of the redundant set. When 
all discretes are received, execution resumes and continues 
until the next synch point occurs. If all discretes are not 
received within a preset time limit, the synchronized 
Rate 
7L roi 
L = listen 
R/T = receive and transmit 
Rate GPC2 R/Tfl i	 gyro 2
computers resume execution and declare any nonresponsive 
GPC to be "failed." Common input data are provided to 
each of the computers in the redundant set through the 
use of the "listen mode," a provision which allows a machine 
to receive information on a data bus not under its control. 
In this mode, illustrated in figure 4-8, each GPC enables 
the receivers only, on the I/O ports that access the buses 
assigned to the other computers in the set. When sensor 
data are requested by a controlling machine, the others 
monitor and retrieve the transmitted data. For example, 
GPC 1 may request data from rate gyro 1 on flight control 
bus 1. When the data are transmitted, also on bus 1, GPC's 
2, 3, and 4 - operating in the listen mode on their bus 
1 ports - retrieve the data simultaneously with GPC 1. 
Concurrently, GPC's 2, 3, and 4 will be requesting data 
from the rate gyros under their control, and each will 
monitor the others' data. Using this technique, all GPC's 
have simultaneous access to all redundant data used in 
an application, yet each string maintains independence from 
a control or interference standpoint. 
Flight Software 
Two essentially independent software systems have been 
developed to operate the Orbiter avionics system. The 
primary avionics system software (PASS), consisting of 
several memory loads, is normally used to perform virtually 
all mission and system functions. The backup flight system 
(BFS) software, consisting of one memory load, is used 
only during critical mission phases to provide an alternate 
means of orbital insertion or return to Earth if a failure 
occurs in the PASS. 
Primary Avionics System Software 
The PASS is structured from the user point of view into 
three major functions (MF's): 
• Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) 
• System Management (SM) 
• Payload (PL) 
GPC3 R.
	
r Rate j	 if	 gyro 3 
Because the software required to satisfy all Space Shuttle 
requirements greatly exceeds the memory capacity of a 
GPC, each of these MF's is further structured into 
operational sequences (OPS), which are collections of 
programs and capabilities required to conduct a phase of 
the mission or perform an integrated function. The OPS, 
either individually or in combination, form memory 
configurations, which are loaded into the GPC's from 
onboard tape units called mass memories. The current set 
of memory configurations is shown in figure 4-9, associated 
with the mission phase in which each is active. To the 
extent possible, the OPS are structured so as to require 
L GPC4	 L	 Rate 
gyro 4 
FIGURE 4-8.—Listen mode.
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FIGURE 4-9.—Memory configurations. 
memory overlays only in quiescent, nondynamic periods. 
The substructure within the OPS consists of major 
modes, specialist functions (SPEC's), and display functions 
(DISP's). Each OPS has one or more major modes, which 
are further substructured into blocks that segment the 
processes into steps or sequences. (See fig. 4-10.) The blocks 
are linked to CRT display pages and, therefore, establish 
an orderly sequence by which the crew can monitor and 
control the function. Sequencing from mode/block to 
mode/ block and internal processing can be initiated by 
keyboard entry from the crew or, in some cases, can be 
initiated automatically in response to a specific event or 
condition detected by the software. The SPEC function, 
initiated only by keyboard entry, also contains blocks that 
are linked to CRT pages and that establish and present 
the valid keyboard entry options available to the crew for 
controlling the operation or monitoring the process. Major 
modes accomplish the primary functions within an OPS, 
whereas SPEC's are used for secondary or background 
functions. The DISP functions, also initiated by keyboard 
input, contain no processing other than that necessary to 
produce the display; and are used only for monitoring data 
processing results. 
The software architecture embodied in each PASS 
memory configuration is shown in figure 4-11. The 
application processes which make up the major functions 
of a given memory load are shown in the lower inner block 
of the diagram, essentially isolated by the system software. 
The control segment manages the sequencing of all 
processing required within an OPS, a major mode, or a 
SPEC, and defines the associated CRT displays and 
keyboard entry options. The user interface consists of three 
primary functions: command input processing, operations
control, and output message processing. User interfaces 
supported in addition to the keyboards and CRT's include 
the launch data bus used to communicate with the LPS 
while on the ground, the network signal processor used 
to process data and commands received by way of the 
radiofrequency (RF) communications links, and the 
intercomputer buses used to communicate between GPC's. 
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FIGURE 4-11.—Software architecture. 
The system control function performs initialization and 
configuration control of the data processing complex 
including the associated data bus network. The flight 
computer operating system (FCOS) functions can be 
grouped into three main categories: process management, 
by which the allocation of all internal computer resources 
is controlled; I/O management, by which the allocation 
of the lOP resources is controlled; and DPS configuration 
management, by which loading of computer memories and 
sequencing and control of the GPC and lOP operating 
states are accomplished. 
Memory configurations are structured as shown in figure 
4-12 to minimize the size of the overlay required when 
changing from one OPS to another. The system software 
base includes code and data common to all OPS loads 
and major functions. The major function base contains 
code and data common to a major applications function 
used in more than one OPS load. The OPS overlay contains 
the applications code and data unique to an OPS load. 
Main memory loading occurs during the transition from 
one OPS to another in response to a major function switch 
selection and keyboard entry from the crew. The contents 
of the OPS in progress determine which of the three parts 
must be loaded for support of the new OPS. For instance,
the transition of the GNC computers from ascent to on-
orbit to entry OPS requires only the OPS overlay; however, 
to establish SM2 in one of the machines alter the ascent 
phase is completed, a major function base overlay is 
required as well. Memory loads can be made either from 
mass memory or from another GPC already loaded with 
the desired configuration. 
Backup Flight System 
The BFS consists of the designated GPC, three backup 
flight controllers (BFC's), the backup software, and 
associated switches and displays. Any one of the five central 
GPC's can be designated the backup machine by 
appropriate keyboard entry. The GPC selected will request 
the backup software load from mass memory and operate 
in an alert standby mode thereafter. During normal 
operations, while the Space Shuttle is under control of 
the primary redundant-set system, the backup system 
operates in the listen mode to monitor and obtain data 
from all prime machines and their assigned sensors. 
Acquisition of these data allows the BFS to maintain 
computational currency and, thus, the capability to assume 
control of the Space Shuttle at any time. At the option 
of the crew, data from the backup machine can be displayed 
on one of the cockpit CRT displays for monitoring 
purposes. Backup data are also available on the instru-
mentation downlink. Backup system control of the Space 
Shuttle can only be engaged manually using a pushbutton 
thumb switch on either right or left rotational hand 
controller (RHC). When either of these switches is 
depressed, logic in the BFC's transfers control of all required 
data buses from the redundant-set machines to the 
designated backup machine. 
The software package for the BFS has been independently 
developed and coded to reduce the possibility of generic 
software errors common to the primary system. The entire 
BFS is contained in one memory configuration, loaded 
before lift-off and normally maintained in that machine 
throughout the mission to provide independence from the 
mass memories. To reduce the crew training required, the 
System Major OPS 
software function overlay 
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FIGURE 4-12.—GPC memory configuration. 
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BFS software is organized similarly to the PASS into 
operational sequences and major modes with SPEC and 
DISP functions; however, only OPS1 (ascent) and OPS3 
(entry) are supported. Although all required guidance, 
navigation, flight control, sequencing, and system 
management functions are included, generally, only the 
simplest mode is mechanized. Limited on-orbit attitude 
stabilization is provided using the last major mode of OPS 1. 
The intent is to reload and return to the PASS if a stable 
orbit has been achieved. The system software uses a 
synchronous approach and, therefore, is significantly 
simpler than is the FCOS. 
Digital Data Bus System 
Twenty-eight data buses connect the GPC complex to 
BTU's distributed throughout the vehicle. Each data bus 
has a l-Mbit/sec clock rate, is formatted in Manchester 
II code, and provides multiple word! message correctness 
checks. The bus system consists of standard multiplexer 
interface adapters (MIA's), data bus couplers (DBC's), data 
bus isolation amplifiers (DBIA's), and twisted, shielded wire 
pairs. To ensure standardization, performance, and 
compatibility, the bus elements were purchased from a 
single manufacturer and MIA's were supplied to all BTU 
designers for installation in their LRU's. The major bus 
characteristics are listed in figure 4-13. The system operates 
in a command/ response mode with all bus control vested 
in the GPC's. The allowable data bus word configurations 
are shown in figure 4-14. All bus traffic is initiated by 
command words transmitted by the GPC's. If the intent
General 
- 1 Mbps clock rate 
- Manchester II code format 
- Multiple word/message Correctness checks 
Multiplexer interface adapter (MIA) 
- Standardized LRU interface to data bus 
- Converts NRZ from host to Manchester II 
- Generates synch bits; assigns parity bits 
- Checks data validity 
Data bus coupler (DBC) 
- Signal coupling between bus and LRU 
- Transformer coupling/isolation 
- Impedance matching 
Data bus isolation amplifier (DBIA) 
- In ground support equipment and SFtB interfaces 
- Amplification for long wire runs 
- Isolation for guillotined signals 
FIGURE 4-13.—Data bus characteristics. 
is to transmit data from a computer to a BTU, a command 
word is sent first as an indicator of a forthcoming data 
transmission, followed by the required number of data 
words. To obtain data from a BTU, the computer sends 
a command word requesting the type and amount of data. 
The BTU then responds with.the desired number of words. 
In all cases, the expected word count must be correct or 
the entire message is rejected. The 28 data buses are 
allocated by functional use, criticality, and traffic load into 
categories as shown in table 4-I. The data bus structure 
interconnecting the GPC's and the various BTU's is shown 
Command	 I Command 
only	 word 
I	 Command	 i I	 Data	 I I Data	 I I Data GPC-to-subsystem	 word word 1 word 2 word N 
transfer 
Subsystem-to-GPC	 I	 Command (Command transmitted by GPC) 
transfer	 word	 I (Data returned from LRU) 
Data	 I I Data	 I I Data 
i word	 1 word 2 word N
FIGURE 4-14.—Data bus message formats. 
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in figure 4-15, which is a distillation of information 
contained in the system block diagram. (Again, the reader 
is urged to maintain correspondence between the figures 
which are used to emphasize a feature or function of the 
system and the system block diagram.) The BTU's and 
their acronyms are listed in the lower left corner of figure 
4-15. The attributes of each of these are discussed in sections 
to follow. The eight flight-critical buses are used for all 
traffic (data and commands) associated with guidance, 
navigation, flight control, mission sequences such as 
separation, and management of critical nonavionics system 
functions. Also included is the interface with the Space 
Shuttle main engine controller. Eight buses are required 
for these critical functions both to provide the necessary 
fault tolerance and to spread the traffic load. Five buses 
are devoted to intercomputer data transmission. Each 
computer acts as the bus controller on one of the five buses 
and is therefore capable of initiating communications with 
the other four machines. Two buses interconnect the five 
computers to the two mass memory units (MMU's). These 
buses are used for loading of software programs as required 
throughout the mission. Four buses provide the interface 
between the five GPC's and the general-purpose CRT 
display and keyboard equipment. These buses comprise 
the primary interface between the crew and the DPS. Five
TABLE 4-I.— Data Bus Utilization 
No. of buses	 Function 
8	 Flight-critical services: guidance and 
navigation, flight control, 
sequencing, and main engine 
interface 
5	 Intercomputer data transfer 
2	 Mass memory interface 
4	 Multifunction display system 
5	 Pulse code modulation master unit 
interface (I dedicated to each GPC) 
2	 System management and payload OPS 
2	 Ground interface and remote

manipulator 
buses are used for instrumentation data. These buses are 
unique in that each computer has a dedicated bus connected 
to a port on dual pulse code modulation (PCM) master 
units. They are used to transmit downlink data and to 
acquire data gathered by the operational instrumentation 
(01) system needed for onboard system management and 
Computer 1
	 Computer 2
o'u	 CPU	 Cpu 
2 data buses
Mission	 llrn 
1 data bus 
data buses
MaU 
Mass
memory I 
Mass
memory 2 
IJ central processing unit 
J display	 driver	 unit 
EBJ display	 electronics	 unit 
EIU engine Interface unit 
GPC general-purpose computer 
UPS launch processing system 
Of' input/output	 processor 
MCIU manipulator	 controller	 interface	 unit 
MOM multipleser/demultiplexer 
NEC master	 events	 controller 
Rt pulse code modulation ster
 Isolation 
m p1 ifi era 
PCM master t3c* 
processing
tW
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FIGURE 4-15.—Data bus architecture. 
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FIGURE 4-16.—Multiplexer/demultiplexer block diagram. 
caution and warning functions. Two buses provide an 
interface for payload support operations, system manage-
ment functions, payload bay door control, and commu-
nications antenna switching. Finally, two buses provide 
access to the launch processing system while on the ground, 
serve as the interface for data gathered from the solid rocket 
boosters, and control the remote manipulator. These buses 
are unique in that they require isolation amplifiers both 
to accommodate the long wire runs to the LPS and to 
isolate the buses when disconnected at lift-off and SRB 
separation. 
Bus Terminal Units 
The BTU's provide the interface between the computer 
complex and the rest of the avionics system and other vehicle 
systems which are supported by the avionics system. They 
can be considered to be a form of distributed input/output 
in that they extend the serial digital interface throughout 
the vehicle to locations as near the subsystems served as 
practicable. As indicated previously, each BTU contains 
one or more standard MIA's. The following discussions 
of each type of BTU are limited to physical and functional 
characteristics. Their use in a system sense is covered in 
the treatment of each subsystem and function contained 
in subsequent sections. The reader is urged to use figure 
4-15 and the system block diagram to maintain corre-
spondence with the overall system. 
Multiplexer/Demultiplexers 
The MDM is a flexible, multipurpose device which provides 
a variety of interface capabilities. Figure 4-16 is a simplified 
block diagram showing the redundant bus interface on the 
DPS side and the I/O modules (IOM's) on the subsystem
side. The MDM recognizes and reacts to any valid, correctly 
addressed data bus transmission detected by either MIA; 
however, simultaneous or overlapping messages on both 
buses are not allowed and, if received, will cause the unit. 
to halt. Normally, overlapping messages are precluded by 
the system architecture and configuration. The sequence 
control unit (SCU) controls the operation of the MDM 
and contains programmable read only memory (PROM), 
which can be programmed to acquire large blocks of data 
with a single request. The 16 I/O slots can be populated 
with a mix of 9 different types of modules from the following 
list: 
• Discrete output high (DOH), 28 volts, three 16-bit 
channels 
• Discrete output low (DOL), 5 volts, three 16-bit 
channels 
• Discrete input high (DIH), 28 volts, three 16-bit 
channels 
• Discrete input low (DIL), 5 volts, three 16-bit channels 
• Analog output differential (AOD), 16 channels 
• Analog input differential (AID), 16 channels 
• Analog input single-ended (AIS), 32 channels 
• Serial input/output (S 10), four channels 
• Tacan/ radar altimeter (special-purpose I/O) 
The system interface requirements for each MDM are 
dependent on its unique location in the Space Shuttle vehicle 
and determine the mix of I/O modules installed. The 
MDM's are located in both avionics bays and in the two 
SRB's as near the subsystems serviced as possible. The 
following three-part MDM nomenclature convention is 
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FIGURE 4-17.—Master events controller. 
used:	 S CRT display formats 
• First letter - Data bus category 
- F - Flight critical 
- L - Ground or launch 
- P - Payload operations 
- 0 - Operational instrumentation 
S Second letter - Location 
- F - Forward 
- A -Aft 
- L - Left SRB 
- R - Right SRB
• Number - Number in a set 
Mass Memory Units 
Two MMU's are installed in the Orbiter, each connected 
to a dedicated bus and addressable from any GPC. They 
are magnetic tape units with random access storage capacity 
of4.2X 106 32-bit words. They provide nonvolatile onboard 
software storage for the following: 
• System software 
• Duplicate copies of application programs 
S Overlay program segments
• Prelaunch test routines 
• Fault isolation diagnostic test programs 
• I-loads (mission- and hardware-unique data) 
• Checkpoint data 
S Downlink data formats 
Control of MMU read/ write operations is from the GPC's. 
Master Events Controller 
Two master events controllers (MEC's) are installed within 
the Orbiter to provide the control interface for critical lift-
off and stage-separation functions including control of the 
pyrotechnic initiator controllers (PlC's). Figure 4-17 is a 
simplified block diagram of an MEC. The critical signal 
selection operates both on a comparison of the four inputs 
and on the relative timing of the arm and fire commands. 
This mechanization is required because the functions 
controlled by the MEC's are unique in that they must occur 
at the proper time and must be prevented from occurring 
at all other times. 
Engine Interface Unit 
Figure 4-18 is a block diagram of the engine interface unit 
(EIU) showing the four Orbiter bus inputs, the internal 
logic in the device, and the three-command/ two-data-return 
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bus interface with the main engine controller. The EIU 
converts the commands received from the GPC's on the 
Orbiter buses to the engine bus protocol, which includes 
the use of the Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghen (BCH) error-
detecting code. Commands received on inputs 1 and 2 are 
passed through on engine buses 1 and 2. The first command 
received on either input 3 or input 4 is selected and passed 
to engine bus 3. The EJU is also used to acquire high-
rate telemetry data from the engines on two buses and 
to selectively pass it to the Orbiter telemetry system and 
the GPC's. 
Display Driver Unit 
The display driver unit (DDU), the driver for the primary 
flight control displays, has four data bus inputs. The bus 
which actually drives the displays is manually selected by 
the flightcrew using a rotary switch. The serial digital input 
data stream is converted in the DDU to appropriate analog 
signals required to drive the various flight instruments.
Display Electronics Unit 
The display electronics unit (DEU) is the device which drives 
the general-purpose CRT's and accepts crew inputs from 
the alphanumeric keyboard. Each DEU has one data bus 
input and contains an IBM SP-0 special-purpose processor 
with 8k 16-bit words of memory used to store critical CRT 
formats and DEU software. Display and refresh of static 
formats selected by GPC command is performed locally 
by the DEU; however, dynamic data are provided by the 
GPC's, integrated into the static format by the DEU, and 
refreshed as required depending on the sample rate. 
Keyboard keystrokes are detected by the DEU, evaluated 
for validity, and transmitted to the GPC if correct. 
PCM Master Unit 
The PCM master unit (PCMMU) is the data acquisition, 
formatting, and multiplexing unit in the instrumentation 
system, and each has five computer data bus inputs, one 
dedicated to each GPC. These units are used both for 
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transmission of computer data to be incorporated into the 
telemetry downlink data stream and for acquisition by the 
GPC's of instrumentation data for use in system 
management and caution and warning functions. Each 
PCMMU also has two instrumentation data bus inputs. 
These interface with the OF and OA MDM's, which 
comprise the instrumentation network. The active 
PCMMU serves as the bus controller on these buses. 
Manipulator Controller Interface Unit 
The manipulator controller interface unit (MCIU) is the 
control computer for the remote manipulator system 
(RMS). It has one data bus port used for receipt of moding 
and outer loop control signals from the GPC's. 
Master Timing Unit 
The master timing unit (MTU) is the primary source of 
time and frequency information for the spacecraft. It is 
not, by the definition, a BTU because it provides time 
information through three flight-critical MDM's, but it is 
described here because of its intimate interface with the 
data processing complex. The MTU contains two 
independent 4.608-megahertz crystal oscillators operating 
in an active/ standby mode. Built-in drift detectors monitor 
oscillator performance and cause an automatic switchover 
if an out-of-limits condition occurs. Frequency dividers, 
counters, and accumulators are included to develop the 
various outputs required. 
DPS Redundancy Management 
The DPS, when configured in the redundant set, is designed 
to operate, when failures are experienced, in a manner so 
as to require minimal action on the part of the flightcrew. 
The system will maintain full operation through any single 
failure with no action whatever. To provide protection 
against subsequent failures, however, the flightcrew is 
required to deactivate disabled components as soon as the 
opportunity arises. Extensive fault detection and annun-
ciation capability is provided to the flightcrew on the 
dedicated displays and on the multifunction CRT's. Each 
GPC continuously assesses its own functionality and that 
of the other machines in the redundant set. This assessment 
produces discrete outputs, which cause lights to be 
illuminated on the annunciator display unit (ADU) located 
on the front overhead panel. The ADU contains a five-
by five-light matrix with a row and a column designated 
for each GPC as shown in figure 4-19. Each GPC controls 
one row of lights—the yellow (Y) is its self-assessment; 
the white (W) is its assessment of the other machines. The 
GPC's have extensive built-in test capability and will shut 
down automatically if failures are detected. No computer
or set of computers can cause another to shut down, 
however. This action must be taken by the crew, based 
on an evaluation of the ADU and other system information 
available. 
The architecture of the data bus network also provides 
failure protection with no immediate response required by 
the crew. Figure 4-20 contains a view of this architecture 
which illustrates the multiple interconnectability of the 
computers and the BTU's. In this figure, the computer ports 
are shown configured for a nominal ascent mission phase 
with GPC 5 selected as the backup computer. Note that 
each primary GPC has control of two flight-critical buses, 
one flight forward and one flight aft. These buses each 
connect to redundant ports on one flight forward and one 
flight aft MDM with primary and secondary status as 
shown. These flight-critical MDM's, in general, provide 
access to one-fourth of the sensors and one-fourth of the 
control effectors required to fly the vehicle. With this 
arrangement, the system can withstand any two failures 
in the computers, the buses, or the MDM's and remain 
operational without reconfiguration, providing no failures 
exist in effectors in active strings. If the failure situation 
warrants, the system can be manually reconfigured to 
maximize the number and effectiveness of the available 
LRU's remaining. For instance, if communication is lost 
to one or more of the flight forward MDM's, the system 
can be manually reconfigured by way of keyboard input 
to communicate with these MDM's on the flight aft buses 
and the secondary ports. To keep the software sequences 
GPC status
Faulty GPC
3 
FIGURE 4-19.—Annunciator display unit. 
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as identical as possible, any such reconfiguration will cause 
all primary GPC's to switch to the secondary ports. The 
MEC's and the DDU's have four inputs each and therefore 
can sustain the loss of any two GPC's without loss of 
function. The ELU's also have four inputs, but two of these 
are switched such that the first input is selected for the 
third output. Therefore, loss of two nonswitched inputs 
will cause loss of one EIU. A broader view of the 
redundancy management features of the avionics system 
is contained in the following sections. 
Display and Control 
The display and control (D&C) subsystem includes the crew 
interface devices located at the commander and pilot 
forward stations and the mission and payload specialist 
stations in the aft part of the flight deck. Figures 4-21 
and 4-22 are photographs of the forward and aft flight 
decks, respectively, showing the locations of the various 
devices. Figure 4-23 contains a simplified block diagram 
of the D&C system. (See also the avionics system block 
diagram [A,l] through [D,7].) Included are the multifunc-
tional CRT display system (MCDS), the dedicated flight
control displays driven by the display driver units, the heads-
up displays, the various pilot input devices, and dedicated, 
hardwired subsystem displays and controls. All, except for 
the dedicated, hardwired devices, receive data from, and 
execute commands through, the central computer complex. 
Four MCDS's are normally installed in the vehicle, three 
on the forward flight deck and one in the mission specialist 
station. Provisions are included for a fifth unit if required. 
Each MCDS is made up of a display electronics unit, a 
display unit (DU), which includes a CRT, and a keyboard 
unit (KBU). Switches associated with each CRT allow crew 
selection of GNC, SM, or PL major functions. In the case 
of the three systems located at the forward station, two 
keyboards are shared by three DEU's. Redundant contacts 
on each key on the shared keyboards provide keystroke 
inputs simultaneously to the left and center or the right 
and center DEU's, respectively. Keystrokes are displayed 
on a message line at the bottom of the CRT for crew 
assessment and approval before execution. When a message 
is designated for action, the DEU performs a validity 
assessment and calculates a checksum; then, when polled, 
the DEU transmits the checksum to the GPC complex. 
Each display bus is connected to all five GPC's; therefore, 
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FIGURE 4-21.—Forward flight deck. 
all DEU messages can be received by all computers if 
appropriate. All computers listening to the bus will act 
on the message and, depending on the major function 
selected, the message content, and the operation in progress, 
will send appropriate format information and dynamic data 
to the DEU for display.
Three display driver units service dedicated flight control 
displays for the commander, pilot, and aft stations, 
respectively. The data which drive these displays originate 
in the computer complex, are transmitted over four flight-
critical data buses, and are converted and conditioned as 
required in the DDU. Each DDU has four data bus inputs, 
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FIGURE 4-22.—Aft flight deck. 
with a manual switch for selection of the active data source. 
The aft unit services only an attitude direction indicator. 
The flight control input devices include the rotational 
hand controller, the translational hand controller (THC), 
the speed brake thrust controller (SBTC), and the rudder 
pedal transducer assembly (RPTA). One RHC and one
THC are located in the aft station, and one THC is located 
in the commander's station. Duplicate sets of the rest of 
the devices are located in the commander and pilot stations. 
All of the controllers use triply redundant outputs, which 
are distributed among the four flight forward MDM's for 
transmission to the computer complex. Electrical power 
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is supplied by the DDU's. 
Heads-up displays are located in front of the commander 
and the pilot for use primarily during approach and landing. 
These units provide a display of flight control data 
superimposed on the out-the-windshield view of each 
station. Each HUD interfaces with two of the flight-critical 
buses. Manual switches provide for selection of the driving 
data source. 
Flight-critical switches, such as those which establish 
the flight control system mode, use triply redundant 
contacts routed through separate flight-critical MDM's 
and buses to the computer complex. Signal selection is 
performed in software in the GPC's using a majority vote 
technique. The action requested is then commanded by 
the computer complex. 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
The functions performed by the GN&C subsystem and 
the sensors and control effectors used in the performance
of these functions are listed in table 4-I1. The sections 
to follow contain discussions of each of these functions, 
the hardware required, the use of the data processing 
complex, the crew involvement, and the redundancy 
management (RM) features provided. During dynamic 
phases of the mission such as ascent or entry, the system 
is normally configured in a redundant set of four GPC's 
with the fifth machine in a backup capacity. A somewhat 
stylized functional illustration of GN&C operation in the 
redundant set is shown in figure 4-24. To avoid drawing 
complexity, the bus/ MDM network is not shown and 
the navigation (NAV) and control (CONT) sensors are 
drawn as though duplicated for each computer to 
represent the redundant input data available. In this 
configuration, each computer runs the same software in 
synchronization and each controls a string of sensors and 
control effectors. All machines, using the listen mode, 
receive all sensor data simultaneously. In the case of the 
IMU's and other navigation sensors, only three units are 
installed; therefore, one computer (GPC 4 in the setup 
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TABLE 4-11.— Guidance, Navigation, and Control Elements 
Mission	 GN&C function	 Sensors	 Control effectors 
phase 
Ascent	 Thrust vector control (TVC), open- IMU's (3), 2-axis SRB rate gyros 	 Main engine! SRB TVC actuators, 
loop and powered explicit 	 (2/S RB), 3-axis Orbiter rate 	 reaction control thrusters, OMS 
guidance; elevon load relief;	 gyros (4), 2-axis body-mounted 	 actuators, aerosurface actuators 
RCS/ OMS control; abort 	 accelerometers (4) 
management 
Orbit Attitude/ translation control; IMU IMU's, Orbiter rate gyros, body- OMS actuators, reaction control 
alignment; rendezvous; remote mounted accelerometers, star thrusters 
manipulator control; payload trackers (2), rendezvous radar 
services 
Entry Blended RCS/ aerodynamic IMU's, Orbiter rate gyros, body- OMS actuators, reaction control 
control; angle of attack! bank mounted accelerometers, tacans thrusters, aerosurface actuators 
angle modulation; g-load, heat (3), air data transducer 
pulse, footprint management; assemblies (4) 
tacan-aided navigation; IMU 
alignment 
Terminal area - IMU's, Orbiter rate gyros, body- Aerosurface actuators 
energy mounted accelerometers, tacans, 
management air data transducer assemblies 
Approach and - IMU's, Orbiter rate gyros, body- Aerosurface actuators, nosewheel 
landing mounted accelerometers, tacans, steering actuators, wheel brakes 
air data transducer assemblies, 
microwave scanning beam 
landing systems (3)
shown in fig. 4-24) has no sensor to control and can receive 
these data only by listening to the other three. Each IMU 
provides the sensed inertial attitude and acceleration of 
the vehicle. These data are compared, after individual 
sensor compensation (COMP) and calibration (CALIB), 
in fault detection and identification (FDI) algorithms 
which detect out-of-tolerance conditions. A navigation 
state vector is calculated (as indicated schematically in 
the diagram, by the box with the integral (INT) sign) 
using data from each IMU which pass the FDI test. If 
data from othef navigation sensors such as tacan or 
MSBLS are to be used (i.e., during entry), they are 
periodically incorporated, after passing though an FDI 
test, into the state vector using a Kalman filter algorithm. 
This update process removes or reduces any systematic 
state vector errors caused by IMU drift, etc. The state 
vector is then passed to the guidance (GUID) algorithm, 
where a vehicle guidance command is generated and sent 
to the flight control module. Here, the outer loop guidance 
command is combined with the inner loop commands 
generated in the flight control algorithm on the basis of 
inputs from selected flight control sensors, such as rate 
gyros and accelerometers. The resultant command from 
each computer is sent to the control effectors, where the 
final command selection process is conducted. The reader
should keep in mind that this discussion of GN&C 
operation is simplified and does not include subtle 
variations such as those introduced by different sample 
rates and extraneous uses of data. 
GN&C Sensors 
The physical locations of the sensors used by the GN&C 
system are dictated by the structural dynamics of the 
vehicle, the required relationship to the center of gravity, 
and, to some extent in the case of the tracking devices, 
by the associated antenna requirements. The inertial 
measurement unit, star tracker, rate gyro, accelerometer, 
and air data sensors are described in the following 
subsections. The others (tacan, microwave scanning beam 
landing system, and rendezvous radar) are discussed in 
the Communications and Tracking section. 
Inertial Measurement Units/Star Trackers, 
Three IMU's and two associated star trackers are installed 
on the navigation base just forward of the Orbiter lower 
equipment bay. The navigation base is a rigid structural 
beam constructed to maintain a precise angular 
relationship between the IMU's and the star trackers for 
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FIGURE 4-24.—GN&C RM configuration. 
alignment purposes. The IMU's, which supply vehicle 
attitude and acceleration data, are normally aligned with 
input axes skewed to provide enhanced capability for 
detecting second failures. The two star trackers, used to 
align the IMU's, are protected from the atmosphere during 
ascent and entry by doors in the Orbiter outer moldline 
and from excessive exposure to the Sun while on orbit 
by automatically operated shutters. The trackers use 
image-dissector tubes to measure azimuth and elevation 
of stars with intensity greater than third magnitude which 
appear within the field of view. A 100-star catalog stored 
in the computer software is sufficient to allow star
observation and IMU alignment in virtually any orbital 
attitude or location. 
Rate Gyro Assemblies 
Four three-axis Orbiter rate gyro assemblies (RGA's) are 
located on the aft bulkhead of the payload bay. Two 
two-axis packages are located in the forward section of 
each solid rocket booster. These units measure vehicle 
angular rates about the control axes for use in the inner 
loop flight control algorithms. Signal selection for the 
Orbiter units is performed as follows. If four inputs are 
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present, the higher of the two midvalues is selected. If 
the input from any unit diverges from the other three 
beyond a preset threshold, the input is rejected, the RGA 
is declared inoperative, and the midvalue of the remaining 
three inputs is selected. A form of quadruple middle-value 
selection is also performed on the SRB gyros by 
comparing data from all four devices. 
Accelerometer Assemblies 
Four two-axis body-mounted accelerometer packages are 
located in the Orbiter forward equipment bays. These 
instruments measure normal and lateral acceleration and 
are also used in the inner loop flight control calculations. 
The quadruple middle-value signal selection process used 
is identical to that used for the Orbiter rate gyros. 
Air Data 
Two pitot/static probes are located on revolving doors 
on either side of the Orbiter forward fuselage. Each probe 
provides four pneumatic inputs, three ram air and one 
static air, in parallel to two air data transducer assemblies 
(ADTA's). The pneumatic pressures are measured and 
converted to digital signals in the ADTA's and sent by 
way of flight forward MDM's to the GPC's as shown 
in figure 4-25. The data are used to calculate altitude, 
airspeed, Mach number, angle of attack, etc., for display 
and for use in the entry navigation, guidance, and flight 
control systems. Redundancy management in this area
is particularly complicated in that the quadruply 
redundant sensor measurements provided to the GPC's 
are not really independent because only two probes are 
installed. Further, sideslip effects can cause differences 
in measurements from side to side that are difficult to 
distinguish from failure effects, and significant transients 
can be expected, especially during Mach I transition. 
Functionally, the RM logic first determines the deploy-
ment status of the probes and their usability based on 
communication faults and other checks. The selection 
filter then either averages the usable inputs or selects one 
if only one is available - first on a side basis, then overall 
and sends the output to the user process after passing 
it through a transient filter. Comparison tests against 
preset thresholds are made to detect and identify failures, 
again first on a side basis. If the two inputs from a side 
miscompare by more than the threshold, the selected value 
from the other side is used, after a sideslip correction 
is applied, to isolate the faulty unit. If no input is available 
from the other side, a dilemma situation is declared and 
annunciated to the crew. 
GN&C Control Functions 
Four distinctly different dynamic control functions are 
performed by the GN&C system during a typical mission. 
These include 
• Hydraulic actuator control of SRB and main engine 
thrust vectors and Orbiter aerodynamic control 
surfaces during ascent and entry 
FIGURE 4-25.—Air data system. 
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• Electrical control of the main engine throttle during 
ascent 
• Electrical control of the reaction control system 
thrusters during ascent (post-MECO), on-orbit, and 
entry phases 
• Electrical control of the orbital maneuvering system 
for velocity changes during exoatmospheric phases 
including the deorbit maneuver 
TVC/Aerodynamic Control 
Figure 4-26 is a simplified block diagram of the Orbiter 
avionics system configured to perform the hydraulic 
control function. Each of the four GPC's in the redundant 
set controls a hydraulic actuating path, which includes 
a flight aft MDM, an ascent thrust vector control (ATVC) 
driver assembly, and an aeroservoamplifier (ASA). The 
ATVC's control pitch and yaw actuators on the three 
main engines and rock and tilt (skewed 45°) actuators 
on the two SRB engines. The ASA's control the position 
of the Orbiter inner and outer elevons, the rudder, the 
speed brake, and the body flap. Each ATVC and each
ASA controls one of four redundant ports on its respective 
actuators, which, in turn, control the position of an engine 
or an aerodynamic control surface. Figure 4-27 is a 
schematic of a typical hydraulic actuator showing the 
quadruply redundant inputs and the single power output 
to the controlled device. Each electrical input influences 
the position of the secondary shaft, which controls the 
drive signal to the power actuator. The resultant command 
to the power actuator is the sum of the inputs to the 
secondary shaft. If one of the inputs is in opposition to 
the other commands, a force fight occurs; the opposing 
input will be overpowered, and the system will respond 
to the resultant sum of the remaining inputs. Further, 
the hydraulic pressure measured at the input to the 
opposing port will be higher and of the opposite sign 
in comparison with the other three, and the ATVC or 
the ASA will, if the signal exceeds a preset threshold 
for an allowable time limit, hydraulically bypass the 
opposing signal. To accommodate systematic biases, an 
equalization loop is included to prevent nuisance 
disconnects. In addition, the crew has a manual switch 
option to override the disconnect signal if the situation 
warrants. 
Sensors	 Forward	 GPCs	 Aft	 ATVCs	 TVC MWS	 Mfltts  
FIGURE 4-26.—GN&C actuator configuration. 
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FIGURE 4-27.—Typical hydraulic actuator drive. 
Main Engine Throttle Control 
A dually redundant, active/standby digital controller is 
mounted on each main engine to manage and control 
all engine performance functions. Throttle and start/ stop 
commands are generated in the four redundant-set Orbiter 
GPC's and transmitted to these controllers through three 
engine interface units, one dedicated to each engine (fig. 
4-28). The EIU's select three of the four input commands 
from the GPC's, add a BCH error-detecting code, convert 
the message to the engine bus protocol, and transmit the 
result to the engine controllers on the three dedicated 
engine buses. Valid commands received on Orbiter bus 
inputs 1 and 2 are passed through to engine buses 1 and
2. The first valid command received on either Orbiter 
bus input 3 or Orbiter bus input 4 is passed through 
to engine bus 3. The engine controllers will respond only 
if at least two identical, valid commands are received; 
otherwise, the last commanded value will be held. With 
this arrangement, any two failures which cause the loss 
of EIU inputs 1 and 2 will result in the loss of command 
capability to the associated engine. For this reason, the 
GPC inputs are staggered among the three EIU's to 
prevent two such failures from affecting more than one 
engine. A hardwired, manually activated path and the 
necessary cues are provided to allow the crew to shut 
down an engine if the automatic path is incapacitated. 
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RCS Control 
The reaction control system uses 44 thrusters mechanized 
in four groups fore and aft to control vehicle attitude 
during external tank separation and throughout the on-
orbit phase, and to augment the aerodynamic control 
surfaces during entry. These thrusters are arranged to 
provide fail operational/ fail safe (FO/FS) control in all 
attitude and translation control axes. Six vernier thrusters 
are included for precise attitude control on orbit. Figure 
4-29 shows the thruster configuration; the associated 
reaction jet driver forward (RJDF) and reaction jet driver 
aft (RJDA) units, which manage the on/off commands 
from the computers; and the flight-critical MDM/data 
bus paths, which carry the required commands and data. 
Each GPC, when operating in the redundant set, controls 
a quarter of the jets, distributed on a control axis basis. 
If a thruster fires because of an incorrect command from 
one of the GPC's or because of some other failure in 
a string, an opposing thruster or thrusters controlled by 
other computers in the set will be commanded to fire 
to counteract the erroneous torque on the vehicle. An 
appropriate alarm will be sounded and the crew will be 
required to take appropriate manual action to disable 
the uncontrolled jet before fuel use or other constraints 
are violated. The combination of control axes, fuel and
oxidizer manifolding and tankage, ullage constraints, 
valving, and electrical power considerations requires the 
mechanization of an extremely complicated redundancy 
management scheme. 
Misfiring RCS jets are detected by sensing the chamber 
pressure in the jet each time it is commanded to fire, 
with an appropriate delay to account for pressure buildup. 
Continuously firing (failed on) jets are detected by 
comparing the state of the computer command to a given 
jet with the voltage applied to the solenoid drivers, which 
activate the fuel and oxidizer valves causing the jet to 
fire. If the solenoid driver voltage indicates that the jet 
is firing with no associated computer command, the jet 
is declared failed on, the crew is notified, and the 
associated propellant manifolds must be closed, to prevent 
loss of fuel. Leaking jets, which can cause an explosive 
situation, are detected by sensing the fuel and oxidizer 
injector temperatures and comparing them against a 
threshold. Again, the associated manifold valves must be 
closed to prevent occurrence of a potentially dangerous 
condition. The status of each jet is maintained in an 
available jet status table in the software. When manifold 
valves are closed to isolate a malfunctioning jet, as many 
as three others will be isolated as well; therefore, the 
manifold valve status must be mapped into all affected 
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FIGURE 4-29.—RCS configuration. 
jets and the table altered accordingly. The availability 
table is monitored by the various digital autopilots, and 
only jets listed in the table are commanded to fire. 
Orbital Maneuvering System Control 
Two OMS engines are installed in pods on either side 
of the aft section of the fuselage. These 6672-newton (1500 
pound) thrust engines are used to perform exoatmospheric 
velocity changes after insertion, on orbit, and for deorbit. 
Figure 4-30 is a simplified schematic diagram of the 
system. The thrust vector direction is controlled in the 
pitch and yaw axes by electric-motor-driven actuators 
commanded through flight aft MDM's. By means of 
redundant gearing, two control paths are provided for 
each actuator. The OMS engine thrust and actuator 
performance are monitored by the redundancy manage-
ment software. Thrust performance is evaluated by 
comparing both chamber pressure and the accrued 
velocity change over a given time with threshold values. 
Actuator performance is evaluated by comparing the 
commanded position with the actual position achieved,
as determined from feedback sensors. The crew is notified 
of off-nominal performance and expected to take 
appropriate action. 
Sequencing 
A number of non-GNC functions included in the 
redundant-set software perform critical sequencing and 
other services for nonavionics subsystems. These 
functions, conducted using either the master events 
controller or the flight-critical MDM's as the command 
transmission media, use the system components shown 
in figure 4-31. The sequencing functions can be classified 
as (1) mission events that are nonrepeating but predictable 
and that require software to initiate and/or to control 
hardware functions or (2) special computations made to 
reduce crew workload. Examples of the current set of 
such functions include 
• Redundant-set launch sequence which controls the 
final count and lift-off operations 
• Main propulsion system data and display sequence 
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• SRB MDM data acquisition 
• Main engine operations sequence 
• SRB separation sequence 
• Main propulsion system propellant-dump sequence 
• Abort control sequence 
• Abort OMS/ RCS interconnect 
• Orbiter vent door control 
• Landing gear isolation valve control 
• RCS/ RCS crossfeed and reconfiguration 
• RCS quantity monitor 
• Orbit OMS/RCS interconnect 
• OMS firing sequence 
• OMS to RCS propellant gauging 
• Master events controller subsystem operating 
program 
• Main engine subsystem operating program
1t111 Master	 L]	 Critical I 144—I events	 I	 1	 pyrotechnic 
controller	 events 
GPC1
Master	 Noncritical 
events	 IEC 
controller	 events 
GPC2 2 
MDM A 
E31— (typ)
Dual 
command 
events E4
MDM B (typ)
Flight-
critical 
buses 
FIGURE 4-31.—Sequencing configuration. 
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System Management/ Instrumentation 
The Orbiter avionics system, using the onboard access 
provided to spacecraft data gathered by the instrumen-
tation subsystem, is capable of performing many of the 
spacecraft monitoring and control functions heretofore 
performed only by ground support teams. In this section, 
this process is described together with the other functions 
and support operations which have accumulated under 
system management. Also included because of similarity 
is the caution and warning implementation. 
Instrumentation 
Figure 4-32 is an overview of the instrumentation system 
showing the interrelation of the major components. 
Control of the system is vested in the PCM master units, 
only one of which is active at a given time. These units 
act as the bus controllers for a network of dedicated 
MDM's configured for acquisition of spacecraft data 
either directly or through signal conditioners. The 
PCMMU's also acquire data from the GPC's on dedicated 
buses and have provisions for a data bus input from the 
payload area. Data from these sources are interleaved,
formatted, commutated, and configured for transmission 
to the ground at a rate of either 128 kbps or 64 kbps. 
Telemetry formats tailored for each mission phase or 
mode are stored in mass memory and loaded into the 
PCMMU's by way of the GPC's. The capability is 
provided in the PCMMU for a GPC performing the 
system management function to read a selected set of 
the data gathered by the instrumentation network. These 
data are used in the onboard system assessment and the 
caution and warning (C&W) functions described next. 
System Management 
The system management function has grown during the 
design process to include much more than the vehicle 
and subsystem assessment services originally envisioned. 
A subset of the SM functions is provided by the BFS 
computer during ascent and entry; however, most are 
performed on orbit under the SM major function by 
whichever computer is loaded with the SM OPS. Figure 
4-33 shows the data buses and interfacing components 
used. Because most of the services requested by the 
payload community to date have required interfaces and 
capabilities similar to those included in the SM function, 
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they have been mechanized under SM rather than under 
the payload major function (PL) as originally intended. 
Payload support functions included are mentioned here 
but described in more detail in the Payload Support 
Operations section. The major SM functions and 
capabilities incorporated include the following. 
• Data acquisition/ output data processing - The 
capability is provided for basic communications over 
the intercomputer buses, the payload buses, and the 
PCMMU bus. The payload bus provides access to 
the payload and flex MDM's, the payload data 
interleaver (PDI), and, through the payload MDM's, 
the payload signal processor (PSP). The launch data 
bus provides access to the manipulator controller 
interface unit. 
• Fault detection and annunciation (FDA) - The 
capability is provided to compare any acquired 
measurement with stored limits and, if the limit 
boundaries are exceeded, to annunciate the 
occurrence. 
• Subsystem measurement management (SMM) - 
The capability is provided to manage and control 
the various data acquisition and storage devices 
including the PCMMU, the PDI, recorders, etc. 
• Payload command and control - See Payload 
Support Operations section.
• Special processes - This is a catchall category which 
has evolved to contain all the various applications 
that do not require real-time redundancy and 
therefore can be performed by a single computer. 
Included at this time are 
- Auxiliary power unit fuel quantity calculations 
- Fuel cell current and power calculations 
- Communications antenna management 
- Hydraulic water boiler quantity calculations 
- Fuel cell purge sequence 
- Hydraulic fluid temperature control sequence 
- Payload bay door open/close sequence 
- Oxygen and nitrogen quantity computations 
- Remote manipulator system control 
- Standby water coolant loop control 
- Recorder tape position computations 
- Fuel cell heater monitor 
• Caution and warning - The dedicated caution and 
warning system is mechanized in an LRU containing 
programmable logic to set allowable limits on each 
input signal. The limits are set manually using 
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thumbwheels. When a limit is exceeded, an 
appropriate light and/or audio signal is activated 
to gain crew attention. The dedicated C&W function 
is backed up by software in the SM function. 
Communications and Tracking 
The major functions performed by the communications 
and tracking (C&T) system include the following. 
• Selection and maintenance of operationally required 
RF communication links to support Space Shuttle 
missions and processes 
• Acquiring, tracking, and establishing two-way 
communication links to the NASA Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) 
• Coherent return of RF communications link carriers 
for two-way Doppler velocity tracking by ground 
stations and provision of turnaround ranging tone 
modulation to the ground during ascent, entry, and 
landing operations 
• Generation of RF navigation aid (navaid) informa-
tion and air traffic control (ATC) voice for 
atmospheric flight 
• Provision of audio/voice communications among 
crewmembers/crew stations within the Orbiter, to 
attached manned payloads, to ground stations, to 
extravehicular astronauts, and to manned released 
payloads 
• Generation, distribution, and transmission of color 
or black and white television to the ground by way 
of RF links 
• Acquiring and tracking passive and cooperative 
targets for rendezvous support 
• Providing for encryption and decryption of voice 
and data 
• Providing for the uplink and onboard hard copy 
of text and graphics data 
• Providing for ground control of communications as 
necessary to relieve crew workload 
• Provision of command and telemetry links to 
detached payloads by emulating NASA Ground 
Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (GSTDN) 
and U.S. Air Force (USAF) Space Ground Link 
System (SGLS) ground stations 
The RF links maintained by the system during on-orbit 
operations are shown in figure 4-34. Direct ground/ 
spacecraft/ ground S-band links including voice, com-
mand, and a variety of data are available with both the
Detached	 Tracking and Data 
payload Relay Satellite 
Astronaut	
S—band S band PM	
S) 
UHF 
S—band FM
nd 
g and Data Relay
 ground station 
Space Tracking and Data Network ground station or 
Air Force Satellite Control Facility ground station 
FIGURE 4-34.—Orbital communication links. 
NASA GSTDN and the USAF SGLS. Both S-band and 
Ku-band links are maintained with the NASA TDRS 
system of geosynchronous satellites; S-band command 
and data links are also possible with detached payloads. 
Ultrahigh frequencies are used for voice and data 
communications with extravehicular astronauts, and an 
S-band video link is provided from the astronaut to the 
Orbiter. 
The RF links maintained during atmospheric flight are 
shown in figure 4-35. In addition to the S-band direct 
and TDRS links, ultrahigh frequency (UHF) voice 
S—baM	 > 
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station________	 UHF 
-
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FIGURE 4-35.—Atmospheric flight links. 
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communications coverage is provided for ATC purposes. 
Three navaid systems are included for use after 
blackout: the tacan system at L-band, the MSBLS at 
Ku-band, and the radar altimeters at C-band. 
The hardware associated with the various communi-
cations links and the other functions of the system can 
be grouped as shown in figure 4-36. Each of these 
groupings is discussed in the paragraphs to follow. The 
multiple antennas used in the system are shown in figure 
4-37. All are flush-mounted and overlaid with thermal 
protective material except for the UHF airlock and the 
Ku-band deployable antennas. The antenna locations 
were chosen to optimize coverage to the extent possible 
within the constraints of available mounting space. 
S-Band Network System 
Figure 4-38 contains a block diagram of the S-band 
network system, which provides tracking and two-way 
communications by way of phase modulated (PM) links 
directly to the ground or through the TDRS, and 
transmission of wide-band data directly to the ground
3 L–band 
tacan 
FIGURE 4-37.—Antenna locations. 
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FIGURE 4-38.—S-band network equipment. 
by way of a frequency modulated (FM) link. The system 
is dually redundant, except for the RF contacts in the 
antenna switch, the diplexers in the preamplifier, and the 
antenna and associated RF cables. Either redundant 
LRU's are provided as shown or dual, electrically isolated, 
internal redundancy is used within boxes. As indicated 
in figure 4-38, the PM and FM systems are functionally 
independent except for the antenna switch assembly, 
which provides RF signal routing services for both. The 
antenna switch, controlled automatically by the DPS or 
manually by the crew, is used to select the antenna that 
provides the best coverage in a given situation. When 
operating the PM system with the TDRS, the preamplifier 
and the power amplifier are used to augment the signal 
available at the transponder. These components are not 
required for direct links. The transponders, the basic 
functioning units of the PM system, support full duplex 
operation, provide a specified phase-coherent turnaround 
ratio, and have the capability to retransmit range tones. 
A Costas detector is employed in the receiver and a spread-
spectrum processor is activated in TDRS modes. The 
network signal processor (NSP) provides for interface of 
the S-band PM system with the audio system, with the 
instrumentation system, with the data processing system, 
and, when security is required, with the communications 
security (comsec) units. The NSP receives voice from the 
audio system, digitizes it using a delta modulation process, 
and multiplexes it with telemetry data from the PCMMU
using time-division multiplexing (TDM). Then, depending 
on the operational mode, the signal is routed through 
or bypasses the convolutional encoder or the comsec unit 
or both and is finally sent to the transponder. The inverse 
of these functions is applied to data received from the 
ground. The FM system provides the capability for the 
transmission of data not suitable for incorporation into 
the limited-rate PM system. Included are main engine 
data, television, payload data, and playbacks of recorded 
telemetry. 
The system provides for several modes and data rates 
as shown in figure 4-39 for both the forward and the 
return links. The "forward" link as referred to here means 
the link from the ground to the Space Shuttle whether 
direct or through the TDRS. "Return" refers to the link 
from the Space Shuttle to the ground, again either direct 
or through the TDRS. Convolutional encoding! Viterbi 
decoding are used in the TDRS modes to improve bit 
error rates. The forward link receiving equipment is 
capable of handling data at two different rates as shown, 
with or without spectrum spreading, transmitted on any 
of four frequencies. A spread-spectrum technique, using 
a pseudorandom noise (PN) code rate of 11.232 
megachips/ sec, is used in the TDRS forward link to reduce 
interference with ground-based communications by 
spreading the power flux density impacting the Earth's 
surface over a wide bandwidth (BW). The four forward 
link frequencies are related to two return link frequencies 
and two turnaround ratios (ratios of Orbiter transmit to 
receive frequencies), NASA at 240/221 and Department 
of Defense (DOD) at 256/205. Two return link frequencies 
are used to minimize interference with payload communi-
cations, which may operate anywhere in the 1.7- to 2.3-
gigahertz band. High and low data rates are available 
on both forward and return links, selectable as required 
to use the link performance margins available. 
S-band Payload System 
Figure 4-40 contains a block diagram of the payload 
communications system, which provides the capability to 
communicate with a wide variety of satellites. The payload 
interrogator (P1) contains both a receiver and a 
transmitter. All signal processing is performed in the PSP. 
The P1 provides 851 duplex channels for simultaneous 
reception and transmission of information with a 
noncoherent-frequency turnaround ratio of 205/256 in 
the SGLS mode (20 channels), and 221/ 240 in the GSTDN 
(808 channels) and Deep Space Network (DSN) (20 
channels) modes. In addition, it provides four receive-
only and six transmit-only RF channels in the DSN mode. 
If a payload and/or a mission requires nonstandard 
services, the capability exists either to route the signals 
to/from payload-unique processors through the payload 
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station distribution panel (PSDP) in the Orbiter payload 	 UHF System 
station, or to transmit them to the ground indirectly 
through the TDRS using the Ku-band bent-pipe 	 Ultrahigh frequency transceivers are provided for voice 
capability,	 communications with ATC facilities and chase aircraft during landing operations and for transmission of voice 
Ku-band Communications/ Radar System 
The Ku-band system, shown in figure 441, serves a dual 
purpose - determining the range and angle to detached 
satellites for rendezvous missions, and providing two-way 
communications through the TDRS network. In both 
radar and communications modes, it uses a 0.9-meter (3 
foot) parabolic monopulse tracking antenna, mounted 
inside the front of the Orbiter payload bay and deployed 
by rotation about a single axis after the payload bay doors 
are opened on orbit. In the radar mode, the system uses 
pulse Doppler, frequency-hopping techniques providing 
range, range rate, angle, and angle rate information on 
uncooperative, skin-tracked targets to a maximum range 
of 22.2 kilometers (12 nautical miles). In the Ku-band 
communications mode, the system provides various data 
rates and formats as shown on the figure. The digital 
rates extend continuously from 16 kbps to 50 Mbps; on 
the 4-megahertz analog channel, the rates extend down 
to dc.
S-band PM 
antenna 
Bent-pipe 
Payload telemetry Payload 
interrogator interrogator 
2 
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telemetry/ Ku-band telemetry/ 
commands I	 signal
co 
corn	 ends 
processor 
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FIGURE 4-40.—S-band payload communications. 
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Radar rendezvous range 
• 22 km (12 n. ml.) maximum, passive payload 	 > 
• 550 km (300 n. ml.) maximum, active payload 
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ground station 
FIGURE 4-41.—Ku-band radar/communication subsystem. 
to and reception of voice and telemetry data from 
extravehicular astronauts while on orbit. Two antennas 
are provided, one in the airlock and one on the bottom 
of the Orbiter. A two-way voice interface with the Orbiter 
audio system is included, giving astronauts performing 
extravehicular activity (EVA) access to Orbiter voice 
communications on as many as three voice channels. 
Availability of three channels allows direct voice contact 
with the ground or the Orbiter crew, and provides for 
recording of the astronauts' conversations. 
Extravehicular Maneuvering Unit Television 
System 
A wide-band S-band FM receiver is provided for reception 
of video transmitted from the EVA helmet camera. The 
S-band hemispheric antennas and a spare port of the 
switch assembly of the S-band network communications 
equipment (fig. 4-38) are used to route the video signal 
to a 40-megahertz wide-band FM receiver. This receiver 
demodulates the video signal and routes it to the television 
(TV) system.
Audio Distribution System 
The audio distribution system (ADS), shown in figure 
4-42, provides intercom and radio access functions for 
the various crew stations and hardline "subscribers" 
involved in a mission. It includes facilities for audio 
processing, mixing, amplification, volume control, 
isolation, switching, and distribution. It provides paging 
capability, communication over various alternative bus 
circuits, distribution of caution and warning signals, and 
communication with the ground crews during preflight 
checkout. The ADS includes six audio terminal units 
(ATU's) distributed as indicated in the figure, two speaker 
microphone units, and an audio central control unit 
(ACCU). 
Television System 
The TV system includes as many as nine onboard cameras, 
two large-screen monitors, two portable viewfinder 
monitors, and the associated switching and control logic. 
Three inputs are provided for TV signals from payloads 
and one output for viewing in an attached manned 
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payload. The cameras, either color or black and white 
depending on the lens assembly installed, may be located 
in the cabin, at various locations in the payload bay, 
and on the RMS arm. All externally mounted cameras 
may be controlled remotely from the cabin. The capability 
is included to record TV data onboard and/or to transmit 
it to the ground as indicated previously. 
Navaids 
Three navaid systems are installed on the Orbiter for use 
during postblackout through landing phases (fig. 4-43). The 
tacan units, used from an altitude of approximately 21.3 
kilometers (70 000 feet) to final approach, are versions of 
units widely used in military aircraft, modified slightly to 
interface with Orbiter systems. They provide slant range and 
bearing to a selected ground station. The MSBLS, used from 
an altitude of approximately 3 kilometers (10 000 feet) to 
touchdown, also a modified version of a military system, 
provides precise range and angle data with respect to 
antennas located near the landing runway. Data from both 
these systems are used in the Space Shuttle navigation and 
guidance software to provide steering commands during 
the approach and landing phases. The radar altimeters 
provide height above the local terrain from 1.5 kilometers 
(5000 feet) to touchdown. The data are used for display 
and crew monitoring purposes only.
Ground Command Interface Logic 
Control and monitoring of the C&T system is a generally 
routine but continuous, time-consuming task. The ground 
command interface logic (GCIL) provides the capability 
for the ground controllers to assume much of this burden 
and thus to free the crew for other tasks. Ground-
originated commands, sent through either the S-band or 
the Ku-band links, are decoded in the NSP and sent to 
the DPS, which interfaces with the GCIL. The GCIL 
includes logic which allows the flightcrew to block or 
supersede ground commands. 
Payload Support Operations 
The Orbiter avionics system is configured to provide an 
extensive, flexible catalog of services to both attached 
and detached payloads which can be readily tailored to 
the unique requirements of a given mission or manifest. 
To a large extent, these services are provided through 
interface devices which allow access to and utilization 
of many of the inherent hardware and software capabilities 
of the avionics system. Figure 4-44 is a simplified 
functional overview of the avionics components involved 
in payload support along with the various command, data, 
and other interfaces available. Refer to the system block 
diagram for the actual component redundancy, wiring, 
and data bus utilization. The payload interrogator and 
payload signal processor devices, which provide RF 
command and data acquisition services to detached 
payloads, and the audio and television capabilities 
provided to attached payloads were discussed in the 
Communications and Tracking section. Also treated 
previously were the various command, voice, and data 
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FIGURE 4-43.—Navigation aids. 
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transmission services provided to payloads by the S-band 
and Ku-band space/ ground communications links. In this 
subsection, other standard services provided - such as 
engineering data acquisition, command generation, 
caution and warning, recording, GN&C data, time, and 
system management - are discussed. It should be noted 
that the hardware and software capabilities provided for 
a given mission and payload manifest may vary widely 
from those discussed in general here; therefore, mission 
documentation should be addressed if that level of detail 
is desired. 
Two of the 28 data buses in the data processing system 
are designated for payload operations. Two payload 
MDM's, PF1 and PF2, are permanently installed on these 
buses, and, although they are used for other purposes 
as well, they provide the prime interface for computer 
support. Wiring and other provisions are included for 
additional "flex MDM's" to be installed in the payload 
bay, also connected to the payload buses. Flex MDM's 
are designed to be easily reconfigurable to meet varying 
payload requirements. The MDM's provide a direct 
interface, through the payload umbilicals, for commands 
and data; PF1 and PF2 also provide the interface with 
the PSP for standard commands and with the PSDP 
for nonstandard commands. The standard real-time 
command (RTC) processing capabilities of the DPS are 
used. 
Engineering data are acquired in the payload data 
interleaver, which has the capability to accept as many 
as five data channels from attached payloads and one, 
through the PSP, from a detached payload. These data 
are then interleaved and transmitted to the PCM master 
unit to become part of the telemetry bit stream. The PDI 
data acquisition format and content are controlled by 
the DPS using loads prestored on mass memory. A 
dedicated payload recorder is provided and is accessed 
either directly from attached payloads or through the 
PSDP. Data playback capability is provided through 
either the FM or the Ku-band signal processor. 
Hardwired interfaces are included for caution and 
warning parameters and safing commands. Backup C&W 
and standard system management services are provided 
by SM software, in the BFS computer during ascent and 
entry and in whichever machine is loaded with the SM2 
OPS on orbit. Vehicle state vector and attitude 
information is calculated in the GNC computers and 
transferred by way of the intercomputer buses to the SM 
machine for retransmission to a payload. 
Electrical Power Distribution and Control 
Space Shuttle electrical power is provided by three fuel 
cells, each capable of generating an average power of 
2 to 7 kilowatts at a nominal voltage of 28 volts dc with
a peak power output of 12 kilowatts for short periods. 
This power is controlled, monitored, and distributed to 
loads throughout the Space Shuttle vehicle by the 
electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) 
subsystem. Figure 4-45 contains an overall block diagram 
of the system showing the major components and their 
relative locations in the vehicle. (Note: To reduce 
congestion, the power distribution system is not 
represented on the overall avionics system block diagram.) 
Within the EPDC, solid-state inverters convert 28-volt 
dc power to 117/200-volt, 400-hertz, three-phase ac 
power, which is also distributed by way of a separate 
redundant bus system to loads requiring alternating 
current. The EPDC is fail operational/ fail safe and 
therefore capable of providing sufficient power for safe 
operation after sustaining two failures. The dc and ac 
distribution systems are described in this section. The 
events control and pyrotechnic sequencing functions 
which are included as part of the EPDC were covered 
in the Sequencing section. 
Direct Current Distribution 
Five classes of buses are used to control and distribute 
dc power. These include main dc, bus-tie, essential, 
control, and preflight test buses. The three redundant main 
dc buses are each connected separately to a fuel cell by 
motor-driven contactors in the main distribution 
assemblies (MDA's), which are located near the fuel cells 
in the midbody area. The main dc buses deliver power, 
protected by fuses, from the MDA's to distribution centers 
as shown in figure 445. The bus-tie buses shown on this 
figure indicate the motor-driven contactors which allow 
manual interconnection of the buses for failure manage-
ment. The ground support equipment (GSE) connections 
shown use the time zero (T-0) umbilical to deliver ground 
power when the vehicle is not operating on internal power 
or when the internal and external systems are sharing 
the load; i.e., during the prelaunch countdown. When 
• main bus is energized, either from the ground or from 
• fuel cell, all associated distribution assemblies also are 
energized. The system uses multipoint grounding and 
structural return; however, all loads are required to 
maintain isolation between primary power returns and 
chassis, and these returns are led to controlled points 
on the fore and aft payload bay bulkheads. 
The essential buses, also established in the MDA's, are 
low-power buses used primarily to control critical vehicle 
functions and to provide power to loads considered critical 
in an emergency. Each receives triply redundant power 
directly through a switch from one fuel cell and indirectly 
from the other two main buses through remote power 
controllers (RPC's) in the respective bus power control 
assemblies (PCA's) (fig. 4-46). They provide control power 
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for selected switching devices, such as those that service 
the onboard computers, and operating power to small, 
critical loads such as the C&W unit, the fuel cell electrical 
control units and reactant valves, smoke detectors, and 
selected cabin lighting. Normally, all essential buses are 
energized whenever any fuel cell/main bus circuit is 
operating. 
Three control (CNTL) buses originate in each of the 
three forward PCA's; each is powered through RPC's 
from two main buses and through a circuit breaker from 
the third (fig. 4-47). Therefore, loss of two main buses 
will not interrupt control power to any function serviced. 
Typically, the control buses provide control power to 
RPC's servicing multiply redundant loads such as the 
guidance, navigation, and control system and those in 
the auxiliary power unit (APU) controllers, valves, and 
heaters; main propulsion system valves; RCS and OMS 
valves and heaters; air data probe heaters and actuators; 
hydraulic controls; and landing gear. During checkout 
and turnaround, each control bus may be selectively 
deenergized; this capability provides a means of verifying 
redundancies in a given circuit.
Two preflight test buses, powered from GSE power 
supplies, originate in aft PCA's 4 and 5. These buses can 
be energized only by ground power and are used to activate 
an inert vehicle for ground checkout or prelaunch testing. 
Three types of distribution boxes provide the required 
services to the various Space Shuttle loads. These include 
the MDA, the PICA, and the load control assembly (LCA). 
As indicated previously, three MDA's are located in the 
midbody area beneath the payload bay liner on shelves 
near their respective fuel cells. The primary functions of 
these devices are to control power from the associated 
fuel cell, to control the bus-tie bus, to protect the main 
bus wires fore and aft and the payload umbilical, to 
establish the associated essential bus, and to control power 
to the respective midbody PICA. 
Twelve PCA's are installed, three in the forward 
avionics bays, three in the midbody area, and six in the 
aft avionics bays. Each PICA receives power from its 
respective MDA or from another PICA and distributes 
it to loads requiring as much as 135 amperes. They provide 
overload protection for loads, wires, and power sources, 
and the means to switch loads remotely through RPC's 
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or relays. The forward PCA's provide power to the static 
inverters, which generate ac. Both fore and aft PCA's 
distribute power to associated LCA's. The aft PCA's - 
4, 5, and 6 - also contain motor switches which control 
ground power. 
The LCA's, located in the fore and aft avionics bays, 
contain hybrid load drivers (HLD's) for control of current 
loads as great as 5 amperes. The HLD's provide capability 
for computer control of selected functions. 
Alternating Current Generation 
and Distribution 
Each forward avionics bay contains three power static 
inverter modules, which are connected in a phase-locked 
array to produce 117/200-volt, 400-hertz, three-phase, y-
connected, four-wire ac power. Direct current input power
to drive the inverter arrays is furnished by the respective 
forward PCA's, which contain circuitry to limit in-rush 
current to an acceptable level when the highly capacitive 
inverters are activated. Output current is limited to 20 
amperes by circuitry within the inverters. The inverters 
are synchronized by an internal oscillator. 
The output of each three-phase inverter array is 
monitored and controlled by an inverter distribution and 
control assembly (IDCA). Relays within the IDCA's 
connect the inverter arrays to the respective three-phase 
buses. These relays can be controlled manually by the 
crew, remotely from the ground during checkout, or 
automatically by internal circuitry in the event of an 
overload or an overvoltage. This automatic disconnect 
feature may be inhibited by the crew during critical 
mission phases to avoid disconnects caused by spurious 
signals or transients. Normal C&W monitoring and 
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FIGURE 4-47.—Control buses. 
alarms will continue to operate when in the "inhibit" 
mode. 
Each of the three redundant three-phase ac buses is 
isolated, is capable of supplying nominal power of 2.25 
kilovolt-amperes, and is grounded to structure in a single 
point. All current is confined to the bus wiring except 
for some navigation equipment which uses an internal 
chassis ground. No provisions have been made for cross-
tying the ac buses to accommodate inverter failures. Power 
reliability for critical ac loads is obtained either by 
providing a switch which allows access to more than one 
bus or by providing duplicate hardware operating off 
separate buses. 
Ten motor control assemblies (MCA's), three each in 
the fore and aft avionics bays, and four in the midbody 
area, provide power and control to motors and other 
three-phase and single-phase loads in the Orbiter.
Approximately 250 three-phase motors are required to 
drive deployment/ retract mechanisms, latches, actuators, 
motorized valves, positioning devices, etc. Remote 
switching capability is provided by three-phase hybrid 
relays, which can be controlled by MDM commands. 
Ground Checkout 
The ground launch processing system controls all ground 
test, checkout, and prelaunch countdown operations until 
30 seconds before lift-off, when control is transferred to 
the Orbiter avionics system. The LPS, however, makes 
extensive use of the features and capabilities of the 
onboard avionics system throughout the process. Figure 
4-48 shows the major components and interfaces involved. 
The two MDM's, LA1 and LFI, also known as command 
decoders, provide interfaces with the vehicle power and 
subsystem switches and controls necessary for remote 
activation and operation of the vehicle. The four SRB 
MDM's perform a similar function. Commands and data 
requests may be sent to these MDM's on one of the launch 
data buses by either the LPS or a GPC. Under the protocol 
established to avoid conflict, however, the GPC's have 
priority and will assume bus control when activated and 
loaded with the appropriate vehicle utility software. Under 
these conditions, the LPS acts as a bus terminal unit 
and issues commands and data requests through the GPC 
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in control as part of the polling process. If no GPC is 
in control, the LPS may assume control of the launch 
data buses directly. 
With the avionics systems powered up and in OPS 
GNC9, the ground checkout mode, the LPS exercises 
control through the use of test control supervisor 
operators. Twenty-six of these have been defined to 
initiate and control test operations. These can be used
singly or in sequence to cause the GPC's to perform a 
variety of functions. In addition, they can be used to 
call a number of test application programs loaded in GPC 
memory which perform operations excessively compli-
cated and otherwise difficult to control by way of the 
TCS. Examples of prestored routines are the ramp 
function generator, IMU calibration, the actuator 
positioning test, and dedicated display checkout. 
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Appendix - Acronyms/ Abbreviations 
AA accelerometer assembly DK display keyboard 
ac alternating current DOD Department of Defense 
ACCU audio central control unit DOH discrete output high 
ADI attitude direction indicator DOL discrete output low 
ADS audio distribution system DPS data processing system 
ADTA air data transducer assembly DSC dedicated signal conditioner 
ADU annunciator display unit DSN Deep Space Network 
AID analog input differential DU display unit 
AIS analog input single-ended 
AM! alpha/ Mach indicator EADI electronic attitude and directional indicator 
AOD analog output differential ECS environmental control system 
APU auxiliary power unit EIU engine interface unit 
ASA aeroservoamplifier EMU extravehicular maneuvering unit 
ATC air traffic control EPDC electrical power distribution and control 
ATU audio terminal unit (system) 
ATVC ascent thrust vector control (driver assembly) ET external tank 
AVVI altitude/ vertical velocity indicator EVA extravehicular activity 
BCE bus control element FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
BCH Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghen (code) FCOS flight computer operating system 
BFC backup flight controller FDA fault detection and annunciation 
BFS backup flight control system FDI fault detection and identification 
BITE built-in test equipment FDIR fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration 
bps bits per second FDM frequency-division multiplexer 
BTU bus terminal unit FM frequency modulation 
BW bandwidth FO/FS fail operational/ fail safe 
FRT flight readiness test 
C&T communication(s) and tracking ft foot 
C&W caution and warning 
CIA controller interface adapter GCA ground-controlled approach 
comsec communications security GCIL ground command interface logic 
CPU central processing unit GN&C guidance, navigation, and control 
CRT cathode-ray tube GNC guidance, navigation, and control MF 
GPC general-purpose computer 
D&C display(s) and control(s) GPS Global Positioning System 
dB decibel GSE ground support equipment 
DBC data bus coupler GSTDN Ground Spaceflight Tracking and Data 
DBIA data bus isolation amplifier Network 
dc direct current 
DDU display driver unit HAL/S high-order software language for Shuttle 
deg degree hemi hemispherical 
DEU display electronics unit HLD hybrid load driver 
DIH discrete input high HSI horizontal situation indicator 
DIL discrete input low HUD heads-up display 
DISP display function
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I/F interface PROM programmable read only memory 
I/O input/output PRS precision ranging system 
ID identification PSDP payload station distribution panel 
IDCA inverter distribution and control assembly PSK phase-shift keying 
ILS Instrument Landing System PSP payload signal processor 
IMU inertial measurement unit 
IOM input/output module quad quadrantal 
lOP input/output processor
RCS reaction control system 
kbps kilobits per second RF radiofrequency 
KBU keyboard unit RGA rate gyro assembly 
km kilometer RHC rotational hand controller 
RJDA reaction jet driver aft 
LCA load control assembly RJDF reaction jet driver forward 
LPS launch processing system RM redundancy management 
LRU line-replaceable unit RMS remote manipulator system 
RPC remote power controller 
m meter RPTA rudder pedal transducer assembly 
Mbps megabits per second RTC real-time command 
MCA motor control assembly 
MCDS multifunctional CRT display system SBTC speed brake thrust controller 
MCIU manipulator controller interface unit SCM subsystem configuration management 
MDA main distribution assembly SCU sequence control unit 
MDM multiplexer/demultiplexer sec second 
MEC master events controller SGLS Space Ground Link System 
MECO main engine cutoff 510 serial input/output 
MF major function SM system management MF 
MHz megahertz SMM subsystem measurement management 
MIA multiplexer interface adapter SPEC specialist function 
MM mass memory SRB solid rocket booster 
MMU mass memory unit SSME Space Shuttle main engine 
MSBLS microwave scanning beam landing system synch synchronization 
MTU master timing unit
T-O time zero 
navaid navigation aid tacan tactical air navigation (system) 
n. ml. nautical mile TAEM terminal area energy management 
NRZ nonreturn to zero TCS test control supervisor 
NSP network signal processor TDM time-division multiplexing 
TDRS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
01 operational instrumentation THC translational hand controller 
OMS orbital maneuvering system TV television 
OPS operational sequence TVC thrust vector control 
P/L payload UHF ultrahigh frequency 
PASS primary avionics system software USAF U.S. Air Force 
PCA power control assembly 
PCM pulse code modulation VU vehicle utility 
PCMMU PCM master unit 
PD! payload data interleaver WBSC wide-band signal conditioner 
P1 payload interrogator 
PlC pyrotechnic initiator controller 
PL payload MF 
PM phase modulation 
PN pseudorandom noise
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